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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis utilizes a soft power framework to examine U.S. public diplomacy 
(PD) efforts in Central America’s Northern Triangle—El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Guatemala—between 2009 and 2016. During this period, the region experienced 
seemingly similar security, development, and migration challenges that affected U.S. 
foreign policy objectives; however, what would explain any variation in U.S. PD 
approaches to persuade or attract the host nation’s public within these three countries? 
This thesis analyzes U.S. foreign policy targeting El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, 
and then looks at complementary U.S. PD efforts from high-level official speeches and 
strategic communication (via conventional and social media). Overall, this thesis finds 
that variation in U.S. public diplomacy efforts across Central America’s Northern 
Triangle between 2009 and 2016 was the result of differences in the U.S. government’s 
prioritization of different soft power initiatives to support democracy. In El Salvador, the 
U.S. focused on strengthening its relationship with the executive branch; in Honduras, the 
U.S. centered on reestablishing the presidency after the military coup; and in Guatemala, 
the U.S. prioritized fighting corruption and impunity at the highest levels of government, 
including the presidency. Lastly, this thesis provides recommendations for the Biden 
administration as it seeks to attract target audiences in the Northern Triangle in 
conjunction with its foreign policy. 
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1 
I. SOFT POWER PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: VARIATIONS IN U.S. 
EFFORTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA’S NORTHERN TRIANGLE 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In July 2014, in the midst of a humanitarian crisis at the U.S.-Mexico border, 
President Barack Obama asked Congress to approve $3.7 billion to address the influx of 
more than 57,000 unaccompanied minors at the border.1 According to the U.S. Border 
Control, three quarters of the children originated from three Central American states: 
Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, an area that perpetually experiences some of the 
highest homicide rates in the hemisphere and is a main thoroughfare for illicit drugs.2  
Along with the request to Congress, Obama also sent a message to the citizens of 
these three countries: “Their parents need to know that this is an incredibly dangerous 
situation and it is unlikely that their children will be able to stay.”3 This and other 
statements suggest the use of public diplomacy (PD) tactics to communicate with Central 
American audiences with the goal of shaping policy (funding) and behavior (reducing 
irregular migration).  
As part of this larger initiative to curtail migration, the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection also launched a “Dangers Awareness Campaign,” which was “an aggressive 
Spanish language outreach effort and an urgent call to action to community groups, the 
media, parents, and relatives in the U.S. and Central America to communicate the dangers 
 
1 Chris McGreal, “Central American Leaders Meet Barack Obama to Criticise U.S. Border Policy,” 
The Guardian, July 25, 2014, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/26/central-
american-leaders-obama-border-policy. 
2 Diana Villiers Negroponte, “The Surge in Unaccompanied Children from Central America: A 
Humanitarian Crisis at Our Border,” Brookings (blog), July 2, 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2014/07/02/the-surge-in-unaccompanied-children-from-central-america-a-humanitarian-crisis-at-our-
border/. 
3 “Obama Urges Congress to Approve $4 Billion for Immigration Crisis,” Time, July 9, 2014, 
https://time.com/2971065/obama-urges-congress-to-approve-4-billion-in-funds-for-immigration-crisis/. 
2 
of the journey.”4 Within El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, the U.S. Embassies 
pushed the awareness campaign in different ways, adopting different methods and 
employing different resources to implement the public diplomacy strategy. An instance of 
this is captured in a U.S. Government Accountability Office report: 
In Honduras, the U.S. embassy’s public affairs section used social media 
and webinars to provide information on migration, while in Guatemala the 
public affairs section at the U.S. embassy there placed ads on newspapers, 
the radio, and buses. In El Salvador, public affairs officials from the U.S 
embassy collaborated with the host government to develop its message 
intended to deter migration. In addition, State officials from the consular 
affairs sections from the U.S. embassies in Guatemala and El Salvador have 
also made efforts to counter misinformation.5 
What explains this variation in the application of U.S. PD to convey the same 
message (“Protect your Children. Do not send them North”), across these three countries? 
More broadly, what explains variation in U.S. PD across otherwise similar contexts 
between 2009 and 2016? 
This thesis focuses on examining those U.S. PD efforts. Public diplomacy refers to 
communication between an actor and a foreign audience that emphasizes behavioral 
outcomes in foreign policy objectives.6 I seek to explore, through a soft power framework, 
what explains variations in U.S. PD within the countries of Central America’s Northern 
Triangle—Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala—between 2009 and 2016. This 
introduction will first outline the significance of investigating U.S. PD in the region by 
showing that while the study and practice of PD has received increased interest, scholars 
have overlooked the Northern Triangle; it will then demonstrate how public diplomacy is 
linked to soft power. A literature review will follow detailing the existing studies on soft 
 
4 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Dangers Campaign,” Defense Visual Information Distribution 
Service, July 2, 2014, https://www.dvidshub.net/feature/dangerscampaign; “Readout of Secretary 
Johnson’s Visit to Guatemala,” Department of Homeland Security, July 9, 2014, https://www.dhs.gov/
news/2014/07/09/readout-secretary-johnsons-visit-guatemala. 
5 “Central America: Improved Evaluation Efforts Could Enhance Agency Programs to Reduce 
Unaccompanied Child Migration” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, July 29, 2015), 
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-707. 
6 Joseph S. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 616 (2008): 94–109. 
3 
power public diplomacy, which I have labeled the ‘Soft Power’ and ‘Smart Power’ schools 
of thought; this introduction will conclude with two hypotheses, a research design, and a 
thesis outline.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Understanding the variations in U.S. PD in Central America’s Northern Triangle 
demonstrates how the United States utilizes the public sphere to meet its foreign policy 
goals in oft-overlooked countries. Though PD is not a new notion, the use of it, and thus 
the study of it, within a state’s foreign policy objectives began to receive enhanced interest 
in the 1990s at the end of the Cold War and as the world’s communications networks 
expanded.7 Then, in the 2000s, PD became “indispensable because of two early 21st-
century [sic] phenomena: instantaneous, 24/7 global media and the proliferation of 
democratic nations.”8 This change in the information environment also coincided with the 
United States’ shift in focus to the Middle East and the Pacific and, therefore, much of the 
research on U.S. PD also shifted attention to those regions (as the literature review later 
reveals). Scholars of U.S. PD conducted little research of the topic within Latin America, 
and thus, a gap in analysis is filled with this thesis that looks at Central America’s Northern 
Triangle. 
Public diplomacy is conventionally partnered with the concept of soft power. This 
concept, which Joseph Nye Jr. popularized in the 1990s, describes a country’s ability to 
influence another state without the use of force. It is “more than just persuasion or the 
ability to move people by argument…it is also the ability to entice and attract.”9 The 
sources of soft power stem from a country’s “culture, values, and perceptions of policy 
legitimacy.”10 Soft power scholars therefore envision PD as a weapon in a country’s soft 
 
7 Nye, 107. 
8 Colleen Graffy, “Public Diplomacy: A Practitioner’s Perspective,” American Behavioral Scientist 52, 
no. 5 (January 1, 2009): 791, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764208326524. 
9 Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 95. 
10 Craig Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts (Lanham, 
Maryland: Lexington Books, 2011), 32, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/
detail.action?docID=850676. 
4 
power arsenal. With strong economic, military, and cultural connections between the 
United States and Central America, soft power PD offers an appropriate platform on which 
to base the analysis of variations in U.S. public diplomacy. 
The use of PD posits that communicating with foreign audiences plays a part in 
foreign policy objectives. Soft power research, however, is not consistent when dealing 
with PD. The following literature review will outline these debates in soft power PD and 
identifies the gap in scholarly work on U.S. PD in Central America’s Northern Triangle. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
When seeking to explain variations in U.S. soft power PD, scholars are divided into 
two schools of thought: Soft Power and Smart Power. The first sees PD as purely a tool of 
a country’s soft power; that is, a country will only use public diplomacy when it is looking 
to attract or persuade via cultural or political values. The second school views PD as a 
complementary tool to a country’s hard power; Smart Power PD thus plays a role in a 
country’s hard power initiatives.11 The literature review will present the two schools of 
thought and common explanatory factors via three levels of analysis: international, 
domestic, and individual. For the purposes of this thesis, I will focus on the domestic and 
individual levels of analysis.  
1. Public Diplomacy Definition (using the framework of soft power) 
Scholars who use the concept of soft power see public diplomacy as two-way 
engagements between an actor and a foreign audience; this emphasizes behavioral 
outcomes in foreign policy objectives.12 Nye sees PD as a communicative instrument to 
attract the publics of other countries.13 There is a recognition of an “inherent and 
interdependent connection between public diplomacy and soft power, both of which point 
 
11 Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 100–109. 
12 Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power”; Ali Fisher and Scott Lucas, eds., Trials of Engagement: 
The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy, vol. 6 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2010), 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=717455; Jan Melissen, “The New 
Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” in The New Public Diplomacy, ed. Jan Melissen 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2005), 3–27, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230554931_1. 
13 Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” 
5 
to an understanding of world politics beyond interstate relations by accentuating the role 
of public as well as non-military means to achieve desirable results.”14 Jan Melissen 
explains that the act of PD is not “a uniquely stately activity, even though it stresses the 
practice of states. Large and small non-state actors…develop public policies of their 
own.”15 Actors in public diplomacy might use broadcasting, subsidize cultural exports like 
movies and music, and sponsor exchanges that, as Fisher and Lucas put it, “influence the 
behavior of communities overseas.”16 This thesis acknowledges that there are many actors 
or organizations who practice PD, but it will only concentrate on official state actors, 
specifically the high-level government officials, such as presidents and ambassadors, who 
set agendas for foreign policy.  
Additionally, views of PD have changed over time, especially as more people 
gained access to the internet in the post-Cold War era either because of democratization or 
because of infrastructure. Many scholars label this transformation as either “New Public 
Diplomacy” or “Public Diplomacy 2.0.”17 
Key to understanding PD as an element of soft power in both schools of thought is 
the acknowledgment that the evolution of technology affects how actors attract foreign 
audiences. As the world entered the twenty-first century, a greater global population had 
access to information. Nye calls this the “paradox of plenty”18 and, given that information 
is ever-present—i.e., on televisions, computers, and smart phones—those that can control 
 
14 Efe Sevin, “Understanding Soft Power Through Public Diplomacy in Contrasting Polities,” in The 
Routledge Handbook of Soft Power, ed. Naren Chitty et al. (Routledge, 2016), 62, https://doi.org/10.4324/
9781315671185. 
15 Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” 12. 
16 Fisher and Lucas, Trials of Engagement, 1. 
17 Kenneth. A. Osgood and Brian Craig Etheridge, eds., United States and Public Diplomacy: New 
Directions in Cultural and International History (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2010), 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=635073; Melissen, “The New Public 
Diplomacy.” 
18 Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” 
6 
narratives and a public’s attention, possess power.19 This then allows the use of PD to 
become “an end in itself.”20 
2. Soft Power Public Diplomacy: Role in Foreign Policy 
Though the scholars in the first school of thought, Soft Power PD, make use of 
Nye’s concept of soft power to study public diplomacy, they argue it is too focused on the 
dominant power actors appealing to foreign audiences. Fisher and Lucas write, “the future 
of public diplomacy will have to go beyond Joseph Nye’s conceptualization of soft 
power...real engagement will be a process of genuine involvement, rather than a more 
attractive sounding method of trying to garner followers.”21 Rather, these scholars see 
public diplomacy as a “two-way transnational exchange of ideas”22 that relies on both 
relaying a state’s message as well as listening to the foreign audiences. This means there 
is a dependence on the foreign country’s culture and history. As an example, the United 
States “will struggle to succeed [in Latin America] until there is a tacit shift in emphasis 
that jettisons long-held beliefs about U.S. superiority and accepts the notions of 
equivalence and receptivity.”23  
Researchers in the Soft Power PD school of thought provide analysis of public 
diplomacy and soft power by controlling for the instruments of hard power. For example, 
Benjamin E. Goldsmith and Yusaka Horiuchi argue that foreign public opinion of U.S. 
foreign policy issues—i.e., those that are prominent in the news cycle—affects not only 
how the United States sets its agenda but also how that foreign leader establishes his or her 
own foreign policy.24 To simplify, a country will take into account the public opinion of 
another country when creating its foreign policies. 
 
19 Nye, The Future of Power, xiii. 
20 Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power, 125. 
21 Fisher and Lucas, Trials of Engagement, 9. 
22 Bevan Sewell, “Competing Narratives: U.S. Public Diplomacy And The Problematic Case Of Latin 
America,” Trials of Engagement, January 1, 2011, 161–80. 
23 Sewell, 164. 
24 Benjamin E. Goldsmith and Yusaku Horiuchi, “In Search of Soft Power: Does Foreign Public 
Opinion Matter for U.S. Foreign Policy,” World Politics 64, no. 3 (2012): 555–86. 
7 
3. Smart Power Public Diplomacy: Role in Foreign Policy 
As a response to critiques in the early 2000s, Nye led a separate school of thought 
within the soft power scholarship and adopted the term “Smart Power” to explain that 
neither soft power nor hard power alone will create effective foreign policy.25 Elements of 
soft power, including PD, complement the instruments of hard power. He writes, 
“Conventional wisdom has always held that the state with the largest military prevails, but 
in an information age it may be the state (or non-states) with the best story that wins.”26 
This “best story” requires credibility, which “is as important with the threat or actual use 
of force as it is with persuading others to accept your viewpoint as being in their general 
interest.”27 Smart Power PD will lose credibility if it contradicts hard power initiatives. 
Public diplomacy becomes increasingly important when other countries 
democratize or when countries become interlinked politically and economically. As 
examples, Nye points to the democratization of Mexico and Turkey in the early 2000s.28 
As the United States sought international backing for the Iraq War, public support for the 
war in the two respective countries was pivotal since the elected officials could now be 
held accountable. What was once a two-actor relationship between diplomats now needed 
to include a third: the foreign public. Here, an improved public opinion of the United States 
would lead voters to support politicians who supported the United States.  
Public diplomacy, however, is not only about boosting public opinion; it is about 
engagement. Jan Melissen writes, “in regions characterized by a great deal of economic 
and/or political interdependence as well as a high level of interconnection at the level of 
 
25 It is up for debate of whether Nye coined the term “Smart Power.” In 2004, Suzanne Nossel, who 
was Deputy to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke at the United Nations during the Clinton administration, 
wrote an article for Foreign Affairs titled “Smart Power;” however, Nye claims to have come up with it in 
2003. Regardless, many Smart Power researchers utilize Nye’s work as a basis for their research. 
26 Nye, The Future of Power, xiii. 
27 Giles Scott-Smith, “Soft Power, U.S. Public Diplomacy and Global Risk,” in Trials of Engagement: 
The Future of Us Public Diplomacy, ed. Ali Fisher and Scott Lucas (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2010), 
100, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=717455; Laura Roselle, Alister 
Miskimmon, and Ben O’Loughlin, “Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft Power,” Media, 
War & Conflict 7, no. 1 (April 1, 2014): 70–84, https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635213516696;  
28 Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 99. 
8 
civil society, public diplomacy has become essential in diplomatic relations.”29 A country 
looking to wield its economic power will use the close relationships that extend beyond 
diplomats and to the citizens of the two countries.  
4. Between the Two Schools of Thought: Explaining Variations in Public 
Diplomacy 
Scholars use three levels of analysis—international, domestic, and individual—of 
public diplomacy to explain variations in its practice. Variables in all three levels factor 
into the differences of a country’s PD. At the international level, scholars from both schools 
of thought agree that how a state perceives and measures its and others’ soft power when 
attracting foreign publics causes variations in PD.30 The domestic level analysis looks at 
variations within the state—from infrastructure to institutional strength to shared 
democratic values. Individual analysis focus on the actors who practice PD. Given the 
smaller scope of this thesis, the following sections will only emphasize the domestic level 
and then narrowly on the individual level to explain how public diplomacy might vary over 
time and between regions.  
a. Domestic Levels of Analysis 
While the Soft Power and Smart Power schools of thought in public diplomacy 
widely share similar views on the variations of the topic at the international level, they 
differ slightly at the domestic level. Both recognize that communication technologies and 
the media within a specific country affects a state’s PD. For example, scholars cite how the 
United States used satellite television in a PD campaign in Egypt that would compete with 
 
29 Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy,” 11. 
30 Melissen; Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power. 
9 
Al-Jazeera’s information.31 Other scholars cite a country’s overall media landscape—
including its press freedom and access to the internet—to explain variance.32 
Soft Power public diplomacy research often focuses on United States diplomatic 
narrative and the subsequent anti- or pro-American sentiment. Sewell argues that U.S. PD 
should account for historical military interventions when engaging with foreign 
audiences.33 This would mean that a varied history between two nations would lead to a 
variation in PD. In another example, Sevin looks at the different public diplomacy efforts 
of the United States, Russia, and Iran, and argues that a country’s domestic institutions and 
values change a country’s public diplomacy campaigns or tactics.34 
The Smart Power school of thought largely negates the importance of history and 
focuses on how certain domestic organizations, like the U.S. Department of State (DOS) 
or the Department of Defense (DOD), execute PD and how domestic elements of hard 
power will cause the United States to vary its PD.35 For example, Giles Scott-Smith writes 
of the economic downturn in the 1970s, which when the “U.S. faced damaged prestige, a 
weakening economic position, and the need to engage with others to solve common 
problems,”36 the DOS organized educational and cultural exchanges “to stimulate 
institutional development.”37 The DOD, a hard power element, also takes part in U.S. 
public diplomacy. Most scholars will write of U.S. military efforts to “win hearts and 
minds” in Iraq and Afghanistan, but additionally, programs like military educational 
exchanges are used as a public diplomacy tool for democratic political socialization. Carol 
 
31 Craig Hayden, “Scope, Mechanism, and Outcome: Arguing Soft Power in the Context of Public 
Diplomacy,” Journal of International Relations and Development 20, no. 2 (April 1, 2017): 331–57, 
https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2015.8; Marwa Fikry Abdel Samei, “Public Diplomacy and the Clash of 
Satellites,” Media and Communication; Lisbon 4, no. 2 (2016), http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/
10.17645/mac.v4i2.385. 
32 Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin, “Strategic Narrative”; Ernest J. Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft 
Power, Smart Power,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (March 
2008): 110–24. 
33 Sewell, “Competing Narratives.” 
34 Sevin, “Understanding Soft Power Through Public Diplomacy in Contrasting Polities.” 
35 Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power; Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin, “Strategic Narrative.” 
36 Scott-Smith, “Soft Power, U.S. Public Diplomacy and Global Risk,” 111. 
37 Scott-Smith, 111. 
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Atkinson writes that if the United States fosters strong democratic values through its 
military exchanges, it will create democratic norms where militaries support its citizens 
rather than only its political leaders.38  
Nye explains Smart Power public diplomacy does not occur in a single actor state; 
but rather, a country’s PD can change depending on another country’s PD or public affairs 
(i.e., domestic) efforts.39 He writes, “there can be joint gains from coordination of public 
diplomacy programs.”40 Therefore, the United States might vary its PD efforts as a 
response to a state’s or non-state actor’s public diplomacy. 
b. Individual Level of Analysis 
To understand variations in public diplomacy, research focuses on the individuals 
who set the tone and agenda for a country’s soft power initiatives. In the case of the United 
States, scholars mainly study the presidents, secretaries of state, and ambassadors. One 
president might treat soft power, and therefore his or her PD, differently than the next 
president. The most common way scholars examine the individual level of public 
diplomacy is by evaluating high-level visits and public statements as well as published 
strategies, initiatives, and testimonies.41 In the Soft Power PD school of thought, they often 
look at only public statements that speak about soft power elements, such as shared values 
and culture.42 Another group of Soft Power PD scholars provide evidence that high-level 
 
38 Carol Atkinson, Military Soft Power: Public Diplomacy through Military Educational Exchanges 
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2014), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-
nps/detail.action?docID=1728029. 
39 Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 107. 
40 Nye, 107. 
41 Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power”; Benjamin E. Goldsmith, Yusaku Horiuchi, and 
Kelly Matush, “Does Public Diplomacy Sway Foreign Public Opinion? Identifying the Effect of High-
Level Visits,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, September 3, 
2020), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3566347; David Ryan, “The Dots above the Detail: The Myopia of 
Meta-Narrative in George W. Bush’s Declarative ‘War of Ideas,’” in Trials of Engagement: The Future of 
U.S. Public Diplomacy, ed. Ali Fisher and Scott Lucas (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2010), 87–98, 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=717455. 
42 Ryan, “The Dots above the Detail: The Myopia of Meta-Narrative in George W. Bush’s Declarative 
‘War of Ideas.’” 
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foreign visits that include PD engagements improve overall foreign public opinion.43 
Interestingly, it is the act of the high-level visit, not the message the individual is 
transmitting, that increases public opinion of the leader; thus, understanding why a high-
level diplomat visits a foreign country explains variance.  
Contrastingly, Smart Power scholars look at how individuals speak about security 
or economic challenges in the public sphere to explain variance in public diplomacy.44 
Nye, for instance, analyzes President George Bush’s use of the word “axis of evil” to refer 
to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea,  and how “foreigners reacted against lumping together 
disparate diplomatic situations under a moralistic label.”45 In Smart Power PD, the way an 
individual prioritizes the act of communicating to attract can explain variation in the overall 
application of public diplomacy. 
5. Evaluation of the Explanations of Variations in Public Diplomacy 
Explanations of variations in public diplomacy as an element of soft power have 
their respective strengths and weaknesses. Completely separating Soft Power PD from hard 
power allows the simplification of explanatory variables. It keeps the practice of PD to 
organizations and actors whose primary goal is to shape behavior through cultural or 
political values. This school of thought also accounts for historical international 
relationships and how they can affect present-day variances in public diplomacy. However, 
given the interconnection of U.S. security cooperation and economic initiatives in Central 
America’s Northern Triangle, this might not explain variations of U.S. PD in the region. 
Smart Power public diplomacy offers a means to analyze PD as an element of soft 
power in conjunction with hard power initiatives. Though difficult to measure, scholars 
have provided evidence how a country uses smart and hard power together to explain 
variances in public diplomacy. This would perhaps explain why, during the border crisis 
of 2014, President Obama linked a soft power message (“families should not send their 
 
43 Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Matush, “Does Public Diplomacy Sway Foreign Public Opinion?” 
44 Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 104; Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power.” 
45 Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 104. 
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children north) with the hard power action of increasing security at the border. Though 
Smart Power scholars speak to the importance of understanding target audiences, they 
disregard the potential importance of how the history of U.S. military and economic 
interventions in a region affects how an audience receives current messaging.46 
Across the board, scholars of soft power public diplomacy give credence to 
presidents and secretaries of state to set the PD agenda. Scholarly work, however, largely 
overlooks Latin America in the twenty-first century. Furthermore, I have yet to find a PD 
analysis that mentions the countries in Central America’s Northern Triangle. Given the 
economic, military, and cultural ties between the United States and Central America, 
further research should be done utilizing aspects of PD in both the Soft Power and Smart 
Power schools of thought to explain the variations of U.S. public diplomacy in Honduras, 
El Salvador, and Guatemala.   
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS OF VARIATIONS IN PUBLIC 
DIPLOMACY 
The following sections provide potential explanations and hypotheses to answer the 
question of “What explains variations in U.S. public diplomacy within the countries of 
Central America’s Northern Triangle—Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala—between 
2009 and 2016?”  
Hypothesis 1: Soft Power factors explain the variation in U.S. public diplomacy. 
Given that the United States was historically heavily involved in the Central 
American politics and their respective economies and militaries from the twentieth century 
onward, this hypothesis would build on the work that history and U.S. domestic 
institutional values will vary its public diplomacy across location and time.  
Hypothesis 2: Smart Power factors explains the variation in U.S. public diplomacy. 
Using Nye’s version of Smart Power public diplomacy, the U.S.’s twenty-first 
century economic and military ties with the three countries would affect how the United 
States attracts the foreign audiences in each country.  
 
46 Nye; Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy.” 
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis utilizes comparative case studies to analyze the variations of U.S. public 
diplomacy in Central America’s Northern Triangle. Looking at the question, there are 
essentially two combined elements that will exhibit variation: time and country. Therefore, 
the thesis accounts for the variations during the Obama administration as well as across the 
three countries.  
To analyze both domestic and individual factors, I use secondary historical sources 
and government data to analyze political stability, economic ties, and military ties from 
2009 to 2016. The congressional research service and the defense department keep record 
of economic and military partnerships. I use source material such as presidential speeches, 
department of state media releases, and congressional testimony, social media posts and so 
forth, to determine the existence and extent of soft power public diplomacy prioritization. 
The state department keeps record of presidential visits to other countries and speeches on 
foreign policy. Furthermore, the state department keeps a publicly available database of 
released Freedom of Information Act documents, which provides evidence of how and why 
DOS personnel made policy decisions during the research period. I also look at local media 
sources to understand the messaging and foreign policy during that time in the specific 
countries. Lastly, I use secondary sources to examine the country’s information 
environment, which includes information infrastructure and degree of press freedom.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis is divided into five chapters: an introduction, three that focus El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala and then a fifth chapter that provides a conclusive 
analysis and implications for the United States in the future. Within each case study, I 
provide information on U.S. foreign policy priorities, I analyze official visits and speeches 
from high-level officials, and then I examine strategic communication campaigns. These 
chapters should answer the questions, “What caused the variation between 2009 and 2016 
in this country?” The last chapter will conclude with condensed analysis and then include 
policy recommendations. 
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II. U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN EL SALVADOR: 2009 TO 2016 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When Salvadoran President Mauricio Funes traveled to Washington, D.C., for his 
first official visit in 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama said, “My main goal today is 
communicating how interested the United States is in continuing to be an equal partner 
with El Salvador…a relationship built on mutual interest and mutual respect.”47 Between 
2009 and 2016, these mutual interests would primarily focus on three issues: combatting 
crime, increasing economic viability, and reducing irregular migration. At any given time, 
these concerns would shift in priority, but rarely did policy focus on challenges outside of 
those three realms. From a public diplomacy (PD) perspective, the United States’ 
communication would reflect these three issues as well as concentrate on building 
legitimacy for the U.S.-Salvadoran relationship as El Salvador transitioned in 2009 to a 
leftist government with historic revolutionary ties.  
This chapter will analyze U.S. PD efforts in El Salvador between 2009 and 2016. 
First, I discuss U.S. foreign policy priorities and then look at official U.S. PD via official 
speeches from the White House, the U.S. secretary of state, and the U.S. ambassador. Next, 
I analyze U.S. PD strategic communication campaigns, focusing on the three nodes of 
communication: the sender (i.e., the United States), the receiver (i.e. Salvadorans) and the 
messenger (i.e., communications technology and the media). Finally, I conclude that PD 
transitioned from building legitimacy for the U.S.-Salvadoran relationship to one primarily 
focused on promoting economic investment and democracy as well as deterring irregular 
migration through building Salvadoran national pride and informing Salvadorans of the 




47 “Remarks by President Obama and President Funes of El Salvador after Meeting,” The White 
House, March 8, 2010, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-
and-president-funes-el-salvador-after-meeting. 
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B. U.S. POLICY IN EL SALVADOR: 2009 TO 2016 
The U.S. policy priorities of combatting crime, increasing economic viability, and 
reducing irregular migration were not new agenda items for the Obama administration; 
however, it did attempt to tackle the issues in a different manner. With security, the United 
States rebranded the Mérida Initiative, a joint Mexico-Central American-United States 
security plan, into the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). This 
security package separated Central America from Mexico “to support immediate law 
enforcement operations,”48 emphasizing counter narcotics operations (the International 
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement foreign aid account accounted for 66 percent of 
appropriations). Between 2009 and 2012, El Salvador received 16.3 percent of the 
approximately $468 million given to Central America.49 The Department of State’s (DOS) 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) targeted programs that moved El Salvador away from its mano 
dura–i.e., hard handed—policing to ones that pursued increasing public trust in police 
through the Model Police Precinct (MPP) program and assisting at-risk youth via education 
and employment opportunities.50 The United States carried out these initiatives in 
conjunction with a Funes-led truce between the Salvadoran government and maras, or 
gangs such as MS-13 and Calle 18. Results varied across the programs. For example, 
 
48 Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke, “Central America Regional Security Initiative: 
Background and Policy Issues for Congress” CRS Report No. 41731 (Congressional Research Service, 
December 17, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41731.pdf. 
49 Meyer and Seelke; William R. Brownfield, “Regional Security Cooperation: An Examination of the 
Central America Regional Security Initiative and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative,” Pub. L. No. 
HHRG-113-FA07, § House Foreign Affairs Committee - Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, 7 
(2013), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130619/101032/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-
BrownfieldW-20130619.pdf. 
50 Brownfield, “Regional Security Cooperation: An Examination of the Central America Regional 
Security Initiative and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative”; Susan Berk-Seligson et al., “Impact 
Evaluation of USAID’s Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention Approach in Central America: 
Regional Report for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama,” The Latin American Public Opinion 
Project (LAPOP) (Vanderbilt University, October 2014), https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/carsi/
Regional_Report_v12d_final_W_120814.pdf. 
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homicides decreased and public satisfaction in the police increased;51 however, rumors 
also surfaced of Salvadoran government death squads targeting suspected gang 
members.52 By 2014, El Salvador’s murder rate increased to approximately nine a day 
from five in 2013, negating hopes that the country had found a solution to its crime 
problem. 
Beyond security, the United States also sought to work with El Salvador to increase 
economic opportunities in-country, thereby also preventing irregular migration. In 2005, 
the United States signed the Central American–Dominican Republic Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR), which, according to then-U.S. President George W. Bush’s 
speech at the signing event, would enhance opportunities for Central Americans in their 
home countries so that “it’s less likely that someone looking for a job will try to come to 
this country illegally.”53 In 2011, Obama took the free trade agreement one step further 
and extended the focus on economic development with the Partnership for Growth (PFG). 
This U.S-funded program looked to “accelerate and sustain broad-based, inclusive 
economic growth by mitigating two principal binding constraints: (1) high-levels of crime 
and insecurity, and (2) a weak tradeables sector.”54 El Salvador was one of four countries 
globally selected for the program, which included 20 jointly identified goals, ranging from 
improving criminal justice effectiveness to raising tax revenues to enhancing the quality of 
education.55  
The PFG was not the only initiative that sought to bring about increased economic 
vitality to El Salvador. In 2007, the U.S. foreign assistance agency Millennium Challenge 
 
51 William L. Marcy, “The End of Civil War, the Rise of Narcotrafficking and the Implementation of 
the Merida Initiative in Central America,” International Social Science Review 89, no. 1 (2014): 1–36; 
Berk-Seligson et al., “Impact Evaluation of USAID’s Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention 
Approach in Central America: Regional Report for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama.” 
52 Marcy, “The End of Civil War, the Rise of Narcotrafficking and the Implementation of the Merida 
Initiative in Central America.” 
53 “President Signs CAFTA-DR,” The White House, August 2, 2005, https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050802-2.html. 
54 James Jones et al., “Performance Evaluation of the Partnership for Growth in El Salvador,” E3 
Analytics and Evaluation Project (United States Agency for International Development, March 20, 2017), 
https://sv.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/202/Final_Evaluation_English.pdf. 
55 Jones et al. 
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Corporation (MCC) signed a five-year compact with El Salvador. The grant, worth $461 
million and concentrated in El Salvador’s Northern Zone, “among other investments in 
community infrastructure, education and business development, the Northern 
Transnational Highway that had been promised to the people of the Northern Zone for over 
50 years.”56 By 2012, according an MCC release, dairy farmers increased their output, 220 
kilometers of road were either rehabilitated or newly constructed, and 17,000 farmers or 
other producers received technical assistance and equipment.57 In 2013, El Salvador signed 
another five-year compact, worth $277 million, this time seeking to tackle the country’s 
low productivity.58 
The PFG would continue in El Salvador until 2015 when the U.S. Strategy for 
Engagement in Central America fully replaced it (though there was some overlap in 
initiatives). Meant as a broader economic plan, the strategy sought to address challenges 
with whole-of-government and whole-of-region approaches that encouraged “private sector 
investment and combine [d] the financial, intellectual, and human resources of North American 
governments, Colombia, the European Union, and multilateral development banks.”59 While 
the release of the strategy coincided with the surge of irregular migration, it in fact, was 
not created as a response to the growth. Rather, its goals were to reduce the existing 
divisions in programs and decision making amongst U.S. agencies in country as well as 
across borders, including more coordination between CARSI, USAID, DOS, DOD, and 
private donors.60 The strategy also pursued more integration with the other Northern 
 
56 Berk-Seligson et al., “Impact Evaluation of USAID’s Community-Based Crime and Violence 
Prevention Approach in Central America: Regional Report for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Panama.” 
57 “MCC Completes Successful Five-Year Compact with El Salvador,” Millennium Challenge 
Corporation, September 21, 2012, https://www.mcc.gov/news-and-events/release/press-release-09212012-
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58 “MCC Board Approves Compact with El Salvador, Discusses Transparency and Open Data,” 
Millennium Challenge Corporation, September 12, 2013, https://www.mcc.gov/news-and-events/release/
release-091213-mcc-board-approves. 
59 “U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America” (The White House, 2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/central_america_strategy.pdf. 
60 Peter J. Meyer, “U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress” 
CRS Report No. R44812 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 12, 2019), 
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Triangle countries via a Central American-led common vision, called the Alliance for 
Prosperity (A4P).61  
C. U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN EL SALVADOR  
The United States varied its public diplomacy from 2009 to 2016 to complement 
U.S. policy priorities in El Salvador to combat crime, increase economic viability, and 
reduce irregular migration. First, the United States moved from communicating legitimacy 
for the U.S.-Salvadoran relationship—and appeared to give precedence over the other 
Central American nations—to a narrative focused on economic investment, democratic 
processes, and educational opportunities. Second, with both the change in U.S. strategy in 
2014 as well as changes in Salvadoran telecommunications, the U.S. Embassy in El 
Salvador began to integrate its communications more with the U.S. mission in El Salvador, 
especially in social media and news management. 
The following section on U.S. PD efforts will look at how U.S. officials changed 
the language of their public speeches about El Salvador using examples from the U.S 
secretary of state, the U.S. president, and the U.S. ambassador to El Salvador. Then, by 
analyzing the Salvadoran information environment in conjunction with U.S. PD efforts, I 
will explain how and why the United States used communication campaigns to inspire 
national pride (#SueñoSalvadoreño) in Salvadorans and to educate them on the risks 
(“Dangers of the Journey”) of immigrating north to the United States. 
1. U.S. Public Diplomacy: Official Speeches 
On June 1, 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attended the inauguration 
of President Funes. During her joint press conference with Funes after the event, Clinton 
“committed to reengaging with Latin America” and underscored commonalities between 
Obama and Funes.62 She spoke of a “new approach to our hemisphere, based on principles 
of shared responsibility and mutual respect…the United States stands ready to assist you 
 
61 The White House, “U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America.” 
62 “Remarks With El Salvadoran President Mauricio Funes,” U.S. Department of State, June 1, 2009,  
https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/06/124388.htm. 
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and your new government,” and then later concluded, “We want to see rule of law. We 
want to see governments working together. But more than that, Mr. President [Funes], we 
want to see people-to-people interaction”63 Because Funes was the first elected president 
from the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), which until the mid-90s had 
been a leftist guerilla group, doubt existed as to whether the United States would maintain 
close ties with El Salvador.64 Thus, Clinton’s words promised that the two countries would 
continue working together to combat crime and drug trafficking as well as increase 
economic and educational opportunities. In a March 2010 e-mail to Clinton from Arturo 
Valenzuela, the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, he addressed 
U.S. desire to build legitimacy for the relationship amid concerns that Funes’ own party 
was questioning the closeness.65 He wrote, “An overwhelming majority of Salvadorans 
have a positive view of the U.S. and do not see a close associate with the U.S. as negative. 
We should not distance ourselves from Funes because a group of hardline elements within 
the FMLN hold his association with us against him. Rather, we should publicly and 
forcefully build on that close relationship.”66 This document reflects that the United States 
saw a positive correlation between Salvadoran public perception and a stronger U.S.-El 
Salvador relationship.  
Obama then reiterated this objective to build legitimacy when he visited El 
Salvador in March 2011, saying, “[Funes] articulated a vision of economic growth and 
social progress that is inclusive of all segments of Salvadoran society. And I want to make 
it clear today that the United States wants to be a partner with El Salvador in this 
process.”67 As his only stop in Central America during his first Latin American tour—and 
 
63 U.S. Department of State. 
64 Meyer and Seelke, “Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for 
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66 U.S. Embassy in Honduras. 
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his only stop to the Northern Triangle during his entire presidency—Obama’s visit alone 
signified a “high-profile photo-op for Funes, meant to strengthen his legitimacy especially 
vis-à-vis the FMLN.”68 Furthermore, Obama also accompanied Funes to the tomb of 
human rights activist Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero, who Salvadoran government 
forces assassinated ahead of the civil war in 1980. The visit to Romero’s grave was a first 
for a U.S. president and though Obama gave no remarks, it was important given U.S. 
involvement to train and fund the Salvadoran government during the 1980s. When 
reporters asked why Obama visited the tomb, Assistant National Security Advisor, Ben 
Rhodes, gave little information and answered, “Monseñor Romero is a hero for many 
people in the Americas.”69 According to some reports, while the visit to the tomb 
demonstrated U.S. prioritization of human rights, some members of the Salvadoran public 
received it differently. In an interview with the Pulitzer Center, the editor-in-chief for El 
Faro digital magazine said, “Obama’s visit (to Romero’s tomb) is an important symbol 
because it creates spaces and perhaps sends the message that the United States believes that 
justice is possible in El Salvador…but symbols are not enough.”70  
Even if some Salvadorans saw Obama’s visit to Romero’s tomb as a symbol that 
was “not enough,” the United States continued to pay homage to Romero’s legacy as part 
of their PD efforts. For example, the newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador 
Mari Carmen Aponte visited the Romero Center at the University of Central America in 
2011.71 Like Obama during his visit to the tomb, Aponte did not give any remarks during 
her visit. Four years later in 2015, when Obama released a statement on the beatification 
of Romero, the administration’s message walked a tightrope when addressing the 
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assassinated archbishop Romero. Obama’s release says, “He was a wise pastor and a 
courageous man who persevered in the face of opposition from extremes on both sides 
[emphasis added].”72 The United Sates saw that legacy from the ten-year civil in El 
Salvador and, especially with an FMLN president, the United States decided to connect 
with the public via these symbolic visits; however, the United States also could not give 
the perception that it was at fault for the atrocities committed during the civil war.  
Neither the U.S. president nor the secretary of state would visit El Salvador again 
before the end of 2016. This could perhaps have been because the United States concluded 
it had established legitimacy for the U.S.-Salvadoran relationship to both key decision 
makers and the Salvadoran public. Moreover, it could have been because the heightened 
attention on El Salvador potentially hindered other relations in the region. Before the 
Obama visit to El Salvador, Maria Otero, Undersecretary of State for Democracy and 
Global Affairs, met with Eduardo Stein, former Vice President of Guatemala and head of 
the Truth Commission for Honduras. Otero wrote to Clinton saying, “[Stein] reports that 
the [President of the United States] trip to El Salvador and the decision to make it solely a 
bilateral meeting is receiving a negative reading in the Central American region. Stein 
states that the U.S.’s ‘favorite treatment’ to El Salvador also extends to supposed preferred 
treatment in financial and political support to that country.”73 Clinton’s response is 
redacted, but based on the fact that Obama met with only Salvadorans during his visit, the 
United States decided to continue to prioritize the bilateral Salvadoran relationship, both 
through public diplomacy and in funding, until the release of the U.S. Strategy for 
Engagement in Central America and the border crisis of 2014.  
After the presidential visit to El Salvador, official speeches from the U.S. 
Ambassador to El Salvador Mari Carmen Aponte show how the United States transitioned 
from focusing on the legitimacy of the U.S.-Salvadoran relationship to focusing on 
economic investment, security partnerships, and democratic processes. For example, when 
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Aponte returned to El Salvador in 2012 after being gone for six months,74 her first speech 
highlighted the recent accomplishments of the MCC compact as well as emphasized the 
U.S.’s commitment to jointly combatting transnational crime.75 Two years later in 2014, 
the United States was one of the last countries to recognize the presidency of Salvador 
Sánchez Cerén, who had been Funes’s vice president. In her speech she said, “There are 
processes that have not yet been accomplished and those need to be observed…we ask for 
your patience.”76 Finally, in her last speech as U.S. ambassador in 2016, Aponte primarily 
centered on the dangers of political polarization and corruption as well as creating space 
for private investors to work with the Salvadoran government.77 Interestingly, the content 
of Aponte’s speeches did not focus on reducing irregular migration, but rather, they 
emphasized working together to combat the factors that cause migration: crime and lack of 
economic opportunities.  
2. U.S. Public Diplomacy: Strategic Communication 
Most of the messaging from the White House to the Salvadoran public post-2014, 
however, would center on irregular migration. Then-Vice President Joe Biden met with the 
three Northern Triangle presidents jointly many times between 2014 and 2016, and during 
his first press conference in the wake of the border crisis, Biden spoke of a “shared 
responsibility” between all involved nations to address irregular migration. He also 
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discussed how governments “agreed to work to counter and correct the misinformation 
smugglers are propagating about U.S. immigration policy, and discourage families from 
sending their children on this perilous journey.”78 Even though Aponte did not center her 
public speeches on it, this statement thus shows why, the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador 
would focus its strategic communications on reducing irregular migration, via the media 
and social media, beginning in 2014.  
The following section on U.S. PD efforts in El Salvador on strategic 
communication analyzes three key nodes of effective communication: the sender (i.e., the 
United States), the receiver (i.e., Salvadorans) and the messenger (i.e., communications 
technology and the media). Each of these three nodes changed between 2009 to 2016. For 
the United States, its communications became more direct and active via two campaigns: 
“Dangers of the Journey” and #SueñoSalvadoreño (Salvadoran Dream). For the 
Salvadoran public, while they still heavily relied on TV and radio for information, they 
also started to use the internet more. As for communication technologies and the press, 
while social media and internet access became more available, members of the media 
actually experienced a reduction in press freedom by 2015. This reduction occurred 
because of two reasons: first, because of government intimidation towards journalists who 
conducted investigations of government affairs; and second, coercive pressure from gangs.  
As the smallest (6.3 million people in 2014) and most densely populated country 
(73.4 percent of the population is urbanized) in Central American, Salvadorans mainly 
receive information via television and radio.79 According to the 2013 Latinobarometer 
survey, 64 percent of Salvadorans watch one to four hours of television a day and more 
than half listen to at least one hour of radio.80 This would explain why, in 2010, the United 
States Embassy in El Salvador proposed to create two TV service announcements, one 
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addressing crime reduction efforts and the other emphasizing the dangers of a trip to enter 
the United States illegally.81 In a separate initiative in 2013 and 2014, the United States 
spent $457,019 on its “Dangers of the Journey” campaign in El Salvador; additionally the 
U.S. Embassy in El Salvador partnered with the host nation to create a TV spot titled “Don’t 
put your lives at risk” warning parents about using coyotes, or smugglers, to take their 
children to the United States.82  
The high percentage of television and radio communication contrasts with the near 
50 percent who rarely or never read the newspaper.83 According to Media Landscapes, 
however, “print media in El Salvador set the national and international agenda, and that 
principally television and radio are used as [a] sounding board of the informational 
content.”84 Evidence indicates that the United States took this fact into account when 
communicating via print media. For example, in 2012, after President Funes disagreed with 
the United States’s decision to designate MS-13 a transnational gang, the U.S. Embassy 
communicated through the media to mitigate a potential disruption in relations. A headline 
from Salvadoran newspaper El Mundo reads, “Aponte reiterates that ‘MS’ [the gang] is a 
criminal organization: U.S. ambassador respects opinion of President Funes.”85 Another 
example comes from 2014 when the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador was on the front page of 
El Mundo asking financial investors to accept an invitation from the Salvadoran president 
and open a dialogue of public-private projects.86 In both examples, Aponte appears to be 
communicating to the educated elite with an overall desired behavioral effect of building 
trust in the Salvadoran executive institution. 
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Additionally, much of El Salvador is connected via mobile telephone—for every 
100 inhabitants, there were 134.5 mobile lines in 2011.87 However, access to the internet, 
whether via a mobile phone or on a computer was minimal: from 2007 to 2015, internet 
usage grew from 6.1 percent of the population to 25 percent.88 Of those who used the 
internet in 2015 (which is 1.5 million people), the most popular social media sites were 
Facebook at 99 percent, YouTube at 86 percent, and Twitter at 59 percent.89 This may 
explain why the U.S. Embassy did not use social media until 2010 and even then, it focused 
solely on Facebook. Two years later, it posted its first video to YouTube and in 2013, the 
embassy joined Twitter.90 Early in the embassy’s social media effort, it is challenging to 
recognize a clear communication strategy. Two of the clear planning efforts in 2013 come 
from one series on visa information and a series called “About the USA,” which engaged 
Salvadoran audiences lightheartedly to share what they knew about the United States.91 
The “About the USA” posts did receive more engagement than the organization’s other 
posts. For example, in a June 3, 2013 post, the embassy asks users, “Have you visited 
Washington, D.C.? Tell us about your experience. If you have not been, what monument 
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catches your attention?”92 The majority of comments were positive, with many expressing 
their desire to see the United States; and while high engagement rates—i.e., a high 
comments to audience size ratio—with positive comments is usually a reassuring metric 
on social media, it does not support, and even contradicts, U.S. policy to deter irregular 
migration and enhance economic opportunity in El Salvador. By 2014, however, the 
embassy began to strategically integrate its use of social media PD with its overall embassy 
goals, specifically to inspire Salvadorans to build strong local communities. Titled Sueño 
Salvadoreño (Salvadoran Dream) this multi-year project piloted “positive messaging and 
success stories to encourage people to stay,”93 across all three social media platforms. This 
campaign utilized dynamic photos and videos and showed Salvadorans telling their own 
stories.  
With the increase in mobile infrastructure, which facilitated more strategic 
engagement on social media, there was also increased communication between 
Salvadorans and the 1.3 million foreign-born Salvadorans residing in the United States (as 
of 2015).94 Since the Cold War, a steady pattern of migration emerged, beginning first with 
the civil war that lasted from 1980 to 1991. During this time, the Salvadoran population in 
the United States quintupled to approximately 465,000 people.95 Even after the civil war, 
both legal and illegal migration continued to increase, mostly due to social challenges and 
natural disasters.96 Thirty-two percent of the Salvadoran diaspora lives in California, 
followed by 15 percent in Texas.97 Of note, the second largest concentration of 
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Salvadorans in the United States is in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, where there 
are up to 400,000 Salvadorans (this number accounts for undocumented immigrants).98 
This large immigrant population communicates and receives news in similar ways 
to those within El Salvador. José Luis Benitez explains that immigrant Salvadorans will 
use the internet to read the leading newspapers and listen to Spanish-language radio. More 
important for this study, however, is that finding that shared stories of migration success 
promoted more international migration.99 As stated earlier, transnational families speak to 
one another via mobile telephone, but new social and communication networks also 
provided an avenue for more instantaneous connectivity.100 Thus, the Salvadoran diaspora 
in the United States played a role in how key U.S. PD information and messaging reaches 
Salvadorans in-country. This explains why the United States aired the same TV and radio 
spots that ran in El Salvador during the “Dangers of the Journey” campaign to large U.S.-
based Salvadoran communities.101  
Yet even with a robust media scene and increasing telecommunications, the other 
central node of effective communication—the journalists who seek to report on the 
country’s issues—struggled for press freedom due to rifts with both the federal government 
and criminal/gang violence.102 El Salvador’s Article 6 of the 1983 constitution protects the 
freedom of expression and before the increase in gang violence in the late 2010s, El 
Salvador seemed to be an example of post-conflict resolution and democratization.103 
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Beginning in 2015, however, the country’s score on the Freedom House World Press 
Freedom Index began to decrease mainly due to government intimidation and restrictions 
of media access to information as well as gangs who threatened journalists.104 For 
example, Freedom House writes that, “El Faro [digital magazine] journalists were subject 
to death threats, illegal surveillance, and harassment following two July 2015 reports in 
which they accused police of abusing suspects in custody and unlawfully killing eight 
people.”105 President Sánchez Cerén also accused journalists of conducting “a 
‘psychological terror campaign’ against his government.”106 Journalists also often 
received threats from criminal organizations, causing members of the media to self-censor 
their content;107 the gangs would often follow-through with those threats. For example, in 
2009, members of the “Calle 18” gang murdered documentarian Christian Poveda and in 
2014, gangs likely killed television cameraman Carlos José Orellana.108 Putting this into 
perspective for U.S. PD efforts in El Salvador, Salvadoran government influence of news 
content and gang pressures on journalists might affect the ability for U.S. messaging to reach 
the Salvadoran public. Moreover, criminal influence can counteract U.S. efforts. For example, 
in 2009, an internet rumor circulated that gangs were imposing a curfew and that businesses 
caught violating the curfew would be targeted.109 Though likely a hoax, in an e-mail exchange 
between embassy staff, one staffer wrote, “I suppose the environment’s ripe for this sort of 
thing, especially given real concerns over violence.”110 Moreover, in the response to the 2014 
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border crises, officials specifically noted immigration misinformation propagated by criminal 
organizations.111  
D. CONCLUSION 
Between 2009 and 2016, U.S. policy in El Salvador focused on combatting crime, 
increasing economic viability, and reducing irregular migration. During this timeframe, it 
shifted from a Salvadoran-centric aid package called the Partnership for Growth to a whole-
of-region U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. The United States would also 
change its public diplomacy tactics in the eight-year span to become more actively linked 
to U.S. policy as demonstrated through official speeches from President Obama, then-Vice 
President Biden, and U.S. Ambassador Aponte as well as through strategic communication 
campaigns.  
With the victory of an FMLN president in 2009, the United States apparently sought 
to connect to the Salvadoran public by building the legitimacy of its relationship with El 
Salvador. It attempted to accomplish this through a high-level visit from President Obama 
as well as acknowledging historic symbols from the Salvadoran Civil War. Once the 
relationship was established, the United States pivoted its official speeches to focus on 
three issues: economic investment, democratic processes, and a commitment to joint 
security initiatives. Concerning strategic messaging, the U.S. simultaneously adapted to 
the surge in irregular migration and increased access to telecommunications to inspire 
Salvadoran national pride and to inform Salvadorans about the risks of traveling without a 
visa. Overall, U.S. PD efforts from 2009 to 2016 demonstrated that while the U.S. sought 
to persuade the Salvadoran public that the U.S.-Salvadoran relationship was strong and that 
it should value democratic processes and institutions, it paradoxically had to contend with 
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III. U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN HONDURAS: 2009 TO 2016 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When a coup d’état ousted democratically-elected Honduran President Manuel 
“Mel” Zelaya on June 28, 2009, U.S. foreign policy in Honduras drastically changed. In 
that, a country that was once a relatively low priority now required the attention of U.S. 
President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. This event would define 
U.S. policy and public diplomacy (PD) in Honduras between 2009 and 2016. During those 
seven years, and especially from 2009 to 2014, the United States focused on Honduran-
specific programs to reduce citizen insecurity. These initiatives concentrated on improving 
rule of law and on enhancing training for law enforcement to combat narcotrafficking. By 
2014, the United States had adopted a regionally-centered policy called the U.S. Strategy 
for Engagement in Central America, which, coincidentally, also overlapped with the 2014 
immigration crisis at the U.S.-Mexico border. It was at this point that the United States 
began to also focus more on boosting economic prosperity and deterring irregular 
migration in Honduras. 
These policy objectives and PD efforts, however, often appeared to lack clear 
direction and faced challenges in implementation between 2009 and 2014. Then in 2014, 
with the adoption of the new strategy, policy and PD tactics became more integrated, 
though they still appeared to be discordant. This thesis chapter first provides an analysis of 
U.S. policy during the coup and its aftermath to demonstrate how and why U.S. policy was 
noncommittal, both because of the U.S. response and because of Honduran challenges to 
rule of law and human rights. Next, I look at U.S. policy from 2010 until 2016, which 
attempted to deal with the decrease in democratic norms as well as an increase in 
narcotrafficking and irregular migration. I then transition to U.S. PD efforts in Honduras. 
I discuss how the United States attempted to use PD within Honduras to support both 
Zelaya and democratic processes during the political crisis. Lastly, I address two parts of 
U.S. PD efforts in the aftermath of the coup. I provide an example of an official speech 
from then-Vice President Joe Biden and discuss his communication priorities. 
Additionally, I analyze strategic communication in the media, which includes details of 
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Honduras’s information environment, and specific social media communication from the 
U.S. Embassy Honduras to prevent irregular migration to the United States. Overall, 
between 2009 and 2016, the United States had difficulties using PD to persuade Honduran 
stakeholders and the public in accordance with its policy objectives to increase citizen 
security (primarily through combatting crime, improving rule of law, and preventing 
irregular migration) because of both the lack of clear policy as well as challenges to 
freedom of expression in Honduras. 
B. THE HONDURAN COUP AND U.S. POLICY: 2009 TO 2016 
Elected in 2005, President Zelaya was a businessman, landowner, and in the early 
2000s, a moderate politician. Once in office, he introduced domestic measures to increase 
the minimum wage and increase free school enrollment. He also resisted pressure from 
business elites to privatize the state-owned electricity company.112 In foreign policy, 
Honduras entered into the U.S.-led Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA ̶ DR) in 2006, which sought to eliminate tariffs and increase foreign 
direct investment in Honduras.113 While the free trade agreement did initially alleviate 
some of the economic pressure in Honduras, the 2008 global recession hit Honduras 
particularly hard because of its close connection with the U.S. economy. Honduras’s 
economy relied heavily on U.S. tourists, foreign direct investment, its export market, and 
remittances from immigrants.114 In 2008, Honduras’s GDP slowed by 2.3 percent to an 
annual rate of 4 percent.115 To offset the drop, in late 2008, Zelaya announced that 
Honduras would join Petrocaribe and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (known for 
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its Spanish acronym, ALBA), which were both led by Venezuela’s anti-American 
President Hugo Chavez. Zelaya’s announcement effectively shifted Honduras’s foreign 
policy to the political left and away from the United States.116 The decision also proved 
controversial among Honduran right-wing politicians and business leaders, who began to 
see Zelaya’s policies as ideologically opposite to the rest of the ruling class;117 
consequently, the Honduran Congress rejected both proposals to join ALBA and 
Petrocaribe. 
Inter-branch conflict continued in 2009. In the spring, when Zelaya called for a 
non-binding referendum asking Hondurans if they would support a rewrite to the country’s 
constitution, “this provoked widespread fears that Zelaya wanted to rescind the country’s 
historic no-reelection rule and perpetuate his hold on power.”118 On June 28, 2009, the 
morning the referendum was scheduled to take place, the Honduran military entered 
Zelaya’s residence and put him on a plane to Costa Rica. Roberto Michelleti, a member of 
the same political party as Zelaya, assumed the Honduran presidency and control of the de 
facto government.  
The United States’ international response, both immediate and long-term, as well 
as follow-on policy were neither particularly strong in opposition of the coup nor did it 
support the military’s actions to oust a democratically-elected head of state. Within the first 
day after the overthrow, Obama released a statement saying, “I am deeply concerned by 
reports coming out of Honduras…I call on all political and social actors in Honduras to 
respect democratic norms, the rule of law and the tenets of the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter. Any existing disputes must be resolved peacefully through dialogue free from any 
outside interference.”119 While Obama’s statement was timely and did support democratic 
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processes, it neglected to fully condemn the coup at the international level. (This thesis 
chapter later discusses U.S. public diplomacy efforts within Honduras in response to the 
coup).  
From a policy perspective, between July and October 2009, the United States 
terminated a large majority of economic and security assistance to Honduras. It suspended 
military assistance programs valued at $16.5 million in July 2009; however, it did continue 
to provide aid that went directly to the Honduran people, such as food and disaster 
assistance.120 The U.S. Embassy in Honduras prohibited its staff from interacting with 
Micheletti or his supporters. By September 2009, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) terminated $9.4 million in aid and the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC) cut an additional $11 million.121 Additionally, U.S. Ambassador to 
Honduras Hugo Llorens maintained close contact with Zelaya’s family (he even housed 
Zelaya’s youngest son and his family in the ambassador’s residence for a short period122). 
The U.S. then canceled the visas of prominent supporters of the de facto government in 
September 2009.123 
With U.S. and European Union support, the Organization of American States began 
to lead negotiations between Zelaya and Micheletti’s regime in August 2009; however, the 
meetings ended in an impasse. The United States then took the lead on negotiations in 
October 2009, brokering a deal known as the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord. The accord 
would create a unity government as well as reinstate Zelaya for the remaining four months 
of his term (the next presidential elections, scheduled pre-coup, were to take place on 
November 29, 2009), but still required Honduran congressional approval.124 However, 
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Honduran lawmakers did not approve the agreement before the elections, putting the 
United States’ policy to legitimize Zelaya as the leader of Honduras in a precarious 
position. In early November, U.S. Senator Jim DeMint said the United States would 
recognize election results regardless of accord implementation while, contrastingly, the 
U.S. Department of State (DOS) said, “Our policy goal has always been to help the 
Hondurans restore the democratic order in the country…our commitment is to the 
Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord and its implementation…Failure to implement the accord 
could jeopardize recognition of the election by the international community.”125 
Ultimately, however, as the elections drew closer without reinstatement of Zelaya, the DOS 
changed direction, and on November 27, 2009, it announced it would support election 
results despite lack of accord implementation.126  
Two days later, Honduras elected conversative candidate Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo and 
on December 2, 2009, the Honduran Congress voted 111–14 to not reinstate Zelaya. 
Though this was not the desired outcome of the United States, the Tegucigalpa-San Jose 
Accord mandated Honduran congressional approval and thus, with the little amount of time 
left before Lobo’s inauguration, the United States reprioritized democratic processes over 
specific support to Zelaya. In a press teleconference on December 3, newly-appointed 
Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo Valenzuela said, 
“Important work remains to reestablish a democratic and constitutional order in Honduras 
and promote national reconciliation in the wake of the June 28 coup d’état, as the status 
quo remains unacceptable.”127 Thus, from June until December 2009, the United States 
provided disparate policy responses in an attempt to quell the democratic crisis in 
Honduras. While it did suspend some aid, it did not recall its ambassador, nor did it 
completely cut off all relations with the Micheletti administration. Eventually, despite 
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funding cuts, the de facto regime maintained control and the lack of clear action gave the 
perception of tacit U.S. approval.  
The 2009 coup d’état and ensuing U.S. response provided the foundation for U.S. 
policy for the next three years until 2014: reducing citizen insecurity through enhanced 
training for law enforcement as well as emphasizing rule of law and respect for human 
rights.128 By 2014, U.S. policy would then shift to be more regionally centered through 
the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America that focused on increasing economic 
prosperity and deterring irregular migration. 
Concerning citizen insecurity, the United States rebranded the Mérida Initiative, a 
joint Mexico-Central American-United States security plan, into the Central American 
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) in 2010. This security package separated Central 
America from Mexico and provided equipment, training, and technical assistance in law 
enforcement operations and “was also designed to strengthen the long-term capacities of 
Central American governments to address security challenges and the underlying 
conditions that contribute to them.”129 It emphasized counter narcotics operations (the 
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement foreign aid account accounted for 
66 percent of appropriations), but also supported government transparency and 
accountability. Additionally, Honduras played a key role in the U.S. ability to fight 
narcotraffickers because of the U.S.-run Soto Cano Air Base, where more than 500 U.S. 
military personnel were stationed to conduct missions to counter transnational crime and 
to provide humanitarian assistance.130 
Between fiscal year 2008 and 2012, Honduras received approximately 17.3 percent 
of the funds allocated to the overall program, around $100 million per year.131 Beginning 
 
128 In the aftermath of the coup, violent crime, narcotrafficking and economic strife were all 
increasing. 
129 Meyer and Seelke, “Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues 
for Congress.” 
130 “Joint Task Force-Bravo Units,” Joint Task Force Bravo, accessed February 11, 2021, 
https://www.jtfb.southcom.mil/Units/. 
131 Meyer and Seelke, “Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues 
for Congress.” 
37 
in 2012, CARSI funding included a Honduras-specific provision that reduced aid due to 
reports of human rights violations. The key human rights concern stemmed from 
allegations of abuse from the chief of Honduras’s National Police, Juan Carlos Bonilla. 
According to Human Rights Watch, the U.S. Congress withheld approximately $10 million 
of funding pending an investigation into Bonilla.132 Additionally, reports emerged that 
since Lobo took office, state security forces were responsible for the deaths of 300 people, 
including 34 members of the opposition.133 In 2013, Honduras adopted a new human rights 
policy to address the country’s challenges; however, according to Peter J. Meyer, human 
rights organizations saw Honduran efforts as insufficient for “failing to properly investigate 
human rights violations and bring those responsible to justice.”134  
Because of these failures in human rights, the U.S. Congress pressured the DOS to 
reduce security assistance even further in 2014. U.S. Rep. Jan Schakowsky led a contingent 
of more than 100 other representatives asking Secretary of State John Kerry to “to use [his] 
leverage to urge the Honduran government to protect the fundamental human rights of its 
citizens, end the use of military forces for law enforcement, investigate and prosecute 
abuses, and more broadly, retore the rule of law.”  Despite this external pressure from U.S. 
lawmakers to the DOS, the United States increased its aid, mainly in counter narcotics and 
food assistance, to Honduras in 2015 from $96 million to almost $134 million.135  
This increase in aid coincides with the introduction of the U.S. Strategy for 
Engagement in Central America, which sought to address regional economic challenges. 
Its stated objective was to create “an economically integrated Central America that is fully 
democratic; provides economic opportunities to its people; enjoys more accountable, 
transparent, and effective public institutions; and ensures a safe environment for its 
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citizens.”136 The strategy also looked to bridge the divisions amongst federal agencies as 
well as private donors.137 Lastly, it also laid out a plan for the other Northern Triangle 
countries—El Salvador and Guatemala—to create a Central American-led common vision, 
called the Alliance for Prosperity (A4P), which it successfully accomplished in November 
2014.138 Though the strategy did not specifically address irregular migration, it did address 
some of the factors that lead to Hondurans leaving their homes, such as promoting work 
force development and increasing resilience to climate change. 
C. U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: THE 2009 COUP 
As stated earlier, the first publicized response from the Obama administration at the 
international level did not fully condemn the June 28, 2009 coup in Honduras; the U.S. 
Embassy in Honduras, however, initially tried to take a stronger stance to urge the 
reinstatement of Zelaya, but arguably failed because of the diminished media freedom 
within Honduras and lack of clear vision from the DOS. In an e-mail from Assistant 
Secretary of State Thomas Shannon to his DOS leadership, he wrote, “This seizure and 
expulsion of the President was an intolerable act by the armed forces and we are going to 
have to say this loud and clear.”139 A minority (nearly 41 percent) of the Honduran public 
favored the ousting of Zelaya and thus, a local public diplomacy push from the embassy 
could have possibly shaped Honduran public opinion toward the reinstatement of the 
elected leader.140 In the ambassador’s first press conference on June 28 at the U.S. 
Embassy, Llorens used firmer rhetoric than the White House. He said, “There has been an 
enormous breach. The only president that the United States recognizes is President 
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Zelaya.”141 He continued with “insisting” that the government permit the return of press 
freedom, which the armed forces had immediately limited after ousting Zelaya.142 
Honduras would experience a decrease in freedom of expression from 2009 to 2016. In 
2013, for example, out of 180 countries, Honduras was ranked 127th in the World Press 
Freedom Index.  
Because of this lack of press freedom, Llorens faced difficulty in communicating 
the U.S. response to the Honduran public. After the press conference, Llorens conducted a 
broadcasted telephone interview with Honduran Minister of the Presidency Enrique Flores 
Lanza. The Honduran government abruptly cut off the broadcast halfway through the 
interview, however, as Lanza was “explaining that the resignation letter President Zelaya 
had purportedly submitted was a forgery.”143 The limits on the freedom of expression 
would continue through the summer and fall of 2009. An Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights confirmed in August “the existence of serious restrictions to the exercise of 
freedom of expression coming from the de facto government…which has generated an 
atmosphere of intimidation that inhibits the free exercise [of] expression.”144 The 
commission also found that journalists and editors had received death threats and were 
attacked because of their opinion on the coup. Furthermore, according at least one 
independent scholar, those media outlets that did maintain independent operations were 
usually biased to the coup’s desired success.145  
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Obstacles to using PD to shape key audiences through the media were compounded 
by the lack of strong statements from the DOS in Washington, D.C., By the middle of 
August, neither the secretary of state nor the assistant secretary to the Western Hemisphere 
had made a comment on Honduras since the suspension of aid announcement in July. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, the then-DOS Policy and Planning director, wrote to Clinton’s chief 
of staff on policy, Jacob Sullivan, about her apprehensions of a “drifting” U.S. policy.146 
She wrote to him saying, “I have been concerned all last week that we are really losing the 
initiative on Honduras…I think this is a real opportunity for [the secretary] to get her first 
real diplomatic win on resolving a crisis.”147 The DOS, however, made no further public 
statements until the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord discussions in October 2009. At that 
point, Llorens shifted much of his public rhetoric in support of Zelaya to one focused on 
strengthening democracy.148 
D. U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN HONDURAS 
1. U.S. Public Diplomacy: Official Speeches 
For nearly the next two years after the coup until the fall of 2011, the Obama 
administration did not prioritize Honduras in the public sphere. This may have been to 
maintain distance from the country’s new President Lobo; it also may have to avoid giving 
the perception that it endorsed its unconstitutional activity and its alleged human rights 
abuses in the wake of the coup. Lobo did visit Washington, D.C., in October 2011, during 
which Obama emphasized the importance of constitutional order as well as free and fair 
elections.149 Additionally, he renewed his commitment on cooperating in security 
initiatives. Then-Vice Biden reciprocated this visit in March 2012. In a joint press 
conference in Tegucigalpa, Biden focused on security and economic development (and 
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only mentioned “rule of law” once).150 He spoke of a shared responsibility in security and 
that, “We understand the grave threats of narcotrafficking and gang violence, and the threat 
it poses to the people of Honduras.” Concerning economic prosperity, he addressed the 
significance of the CAFTA-DR and his country’s interest in developing a more prosperous 
Honduras. Later, in an interview with Diario La Prensa newspaper, only then did he 
express the administration’s concerns about irregular migration.151 Given that Biden did 
not mention migration in his initial remarks, it appears it was not yet a U.S. policy priority 
in Honduras, yet his visit did signal that the United States was looking to strengthen the 
post-coup U.S.-Honduran relationship. 
Of note, during Biden’s visit to Honduras he did not meet with any local Honduran 
civic groups or members of the public, which is a typical public diplomacy tool for key 
officials.152 This is especially intriguing because during his trip to Mexico the day prior, 
Biden visited the Basilica of Our Lady Guadalupe in the middle of Mexico City.153  
2. U.S. Public Diplomacy: Strategic Communication  
Though no high-level official from the U.S. executive branch would return to 
Honduras for an official visit, the White House would still communicate via the media to 
the Honduran public post-2012; however, it would center more on deterring on irregular 
migration. For example, Biden met with the three Northern Triangle presidents jointly 
many times between 2014 and 2016, and during his first press conference in the wake of 
the border crisis, Biden spoke of again of a “shared responsibility” between all involved 
nations to address irregular migration. He also discussed how governments “agreed to 
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work to counter and correct the misinformation smugglers are propagating about U.S. 
immigration policy, and discourage families from sending their children on this perilous 
journey.”154 The U.S. Embassy in Honduras adopted similar rhetoric on irregular 
migration, but also primarily used the local media to reiterate the importance of rule of law 
and human rights. Its social media campaign that attempted to deter irregular migration by 
seeking to persuade Honduran parents that their children needed them through a campaign 
was titled “Nuestros Niños Necesitan” (Our Children Need). Furthermore, because of 
reduced journalistic freedom and lack of telecommunications infrastructure, it is unlikely 
that the United States reached the majority of the Honduran public through its PD efforts 
in the media and online. The following section looks at U.S. PD efforts in strategic 
communication and social media by discussing the three nodes of communication: the 
sender (i.e., the United States), the receiver (i.e., Hondurans) and the messenger (i.e., 
communications technology and the media).  
Honduras’s population of 10 million is divided almost evenly between rural and 
urban areas (approximately 2 million of its citizens live in the two main cities of 
Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula) and they mainly receive their information via radio. 
According to the 2013 Latinobarometer survey, 60 percent of Hondurans listen to at least 
one hour of radio a day.155 This would explain why, in September 2009, then-Ambassador 
Llorens conducted a radio interview urging the de facto government to reinstate 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression to the Honduran public.156 This 
message would have been of particular importance in attempting to shape the public’s 
perceptions given that, in 2013, nearly 66 percent of Hondurans believed, “The government 
should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that might be politically 
destabilizing.”157 Thus, Llorens would have had an interest in also convincing the public, 
using radio communication, that freedom of expression was important in a democracy.  
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The high number of radio listeners is contrasted with the lower percentage of 
television watchers (36.2 percent watch one to two hours of television a day on weekdays), 
newspaper readers (65 percent never read a newspaper) and even lower amount who use 
the internet (77.8 percent had never connected to the internet in 2013).158 During this time 
period, television, and digital media increased their capacity to reach more Hondurans 
because of technological developments whereas print media suffered. According to Media 
Landscapes, “The loss of influence and trust from the public, the sharp slowdown in sales 
volume and the constant political crises of Honduran democracy have caused a ‘forced 
migration’ towards technology.”159 Despite these challenges in telecommunications and 
press freedom, between 2011 and 2016, the U.S. Embassy in Honduras communicated 
using digital and social media to highlight democratic processes and respect of human 
rights. Print media would often use embassy tweets to write their reports on U.S. policy 
news. For example, in 2014, an El Heraldo story used U.S. Ambassador Lisa Kubiske’s 
tweet to report that, “the U.S. diplomatic representative says her country’s support to 
‘combat organized crime in Honduras depends on clean and brave leadership.’”160 Thus, 
the U.S. Embassy likely used this mode of communication because it was aware that key 
decisionmakers and business elites would read the content. Kubiske’s tweet is also an 
example of how the embassy utilized social media in a more integrated manner to 
complement its security and rule of law policy objectives after the introduction of the U.S. 
Strategy for Engagement.  
This was not always the same in other post-2014 social media efforts. After the 
U.S.-Mexico border crisis in summer 2014, the embassy launched a public information 
campaign to persuade Hondurans not to immigrate north.161 Their campaign, titled 
“Nuestros Niños Necesitan” (Our Children Need), was a series of short videos and 
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infographics on Facebook that included positive messages about what children need to lead 
happy and healthy lives. For example, one infographic said, “Our children need 
security”162 while another read, “Our children need education.”163 These messages were 
meant for parents who might have been thinking of sending their children unaccompanied 
to the U.S. border, yet there is one major issue with this campaign strategy: only 30 percent 
of the population had access to the internet and of those users, only 25 percent used 
Facebook.164 In the country where the primary reasons for migrating are economic 
opportunity and violence, it is unlikely most of the intended target audience actually saw 
these messages.165 
E. CONCLUSION 
This analysis of U.S. foreign policy and its complementary PD initiatives in 
Honduras between 2009 and 2016 is an example of how both discordant U.S. priorities and 
the in-country domestic situation negatively affected the U.S. ability to meets its objectives. 
During these seven years, the U.S. faced challenges within Honduras to include democratic 
instability, an uptick in narcotrafficking, decrease in economic prosperity, and an increase 
in irregular migration. The June 28, 2009 coup d’état was the key incident that affected 
most U.S. PD efforts during this period, from official speeches to strategic communication 
campaigns. Even though the United States did seek to prioritize security and economic 
programs, the challenges in rule of law and respect for human rights prevented the U.S. 
from fully engaging in those initiatives. 
This analysis shows that the United States had many policy priorities in Honduras, 
yet often these policies lacked clear direction and conviction. Because the Obama 
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administration lost the initiative in its international response to the coup and also because 
the Honduran de facto government limited press freedom, the U.S. Embassy in Honduras 
faced difficulties using PD in the aftermath of the political crisis. The follow-on challenges 
to democratic rule of law meant that the United States distanced itself from the new 
Honduran administration in 2010 until 2012. Then, with the visit from Biden and his speech 
on security and economics, this signaled that the U.S. was looking to move past the coup 
and build legitimacy for the Honduran government. By 2014, the White House faced the 
immigration crisis and the embassy used social media to try to deter migration while it also 
continued to push messaging on rule of law. Lastly, the continued decrease in Honduran 
press freedom as well as weak telecommunications infrastructure compounded the U.S. 
ability to use PD to persuade or the Honduran public. 
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IV. U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN GUATEMALA: 2009 TO 2016 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In a September 2016 speech at the 20th Annual CAF (Development Bank of Latin 
America) Conference in Washington, D.C., then-Vice President Joe Biden shared a story 
about attending the January 2016 inauguration of Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales. 
He said, “I’ve been to a lot of inaugurations, but President Morales did something amazing. 
He asked, when he was sworn in, the audience and all citizens watching at home to stand 
and place their right hands over their hearts, and join him in taking an oath. An oath to fight 
corruption and put Guatemala first…And it was a powerful sign that the region was 
beginning to change.”166 This part of Biden’s speech that highlighted fighting corruption 
was emblematic of both U.S. foreign policy priorities in Guatemala and its complementary 
public diplomacy (PD) efforts between 2009 and 2016. During this time, it would be an 
overarching theme as the United States worked with Guatemala, a country that 
Transparency International perennially labeled “corrupt” or “very corrupt.”167 Despite this 
challenge of corruption, the United States policy and its PD emphasized boosting economic 
prosperity, increasing citizen security, supporting rule of law through the United Nations-
led Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (known by its Spanish acronym, CICIG), 
and reducing irregular migration. The prioritization of these policies fluctuated during this 
period depending on external factors, with reducing irregular migration and support for 
rule of law increasingly demanding more attention by 2016. 
This chapter analyzes U.S. PD efforts in Guatemala between 2009 and 2016. First, 
I discuss U.S. foreign policy objectives and then look at U.S. PD efforts via official 
speeches from the vice president and the U.S. secretary of state. Next, I examine U.S. 
strategic communication campaigns, focusing on U.S. messaging and how Guatemalans 
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receive those messages through the media (both conventional and social). In its strategic 
communication, the United States focused on sharing democratic judicial principles and 
the dangers of migrating while either glossing over or rebranding its security cooperation 
as economic prosperity initiatives. Overall, I conclude that, because of high-level 
Guatemalan government corruption, the United States attempted to use PD to influence 
Guatemalans to trust in rule of law as well as refrain from migrating from their country. 
B. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN GUATEMALA: 2009 TO 2016 
Between 2009 and 2016, the United States focused its Guatemalan foreign policy 
mainly on economic prosperity, citizen security, rule of law, and irregular migration. 
Concerning economic prosperity, the United States divided its efforts into two parts: 
boosting trade between the two countries through the Dominican Republic-Central 
America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA ̶ DR) and reducing food insecurity in the rural 
regions of the country. Regarding trade, President George W. Bush originally signed the 
CAFTA ̶ DR in 2005 to open markets for U.S. products in the region and to strengthen ties 
with democracies in the hemisphere.168 From 2005 to 2016, U.S. exports to Guatemala 
increased by 107 percent to $5.84 billion and Guatemalan exports to the United States 
increased 31 percent to $3.9 billion, putting Guatemala in a trade deficit .169 In 2010, the 
agreement hit a roadblock when the United States accused Guatemala of failing to enforce 
its labor laws. Mary Finley Brook writes, “Illegal dismissals, health and safety violations, 
and violence against union members and labour organizers remain [ed] widespread, 
particularly in Guatemala…U.S. pressure for reform was slow and limited.” In fact, the 
United States requested an arbitrations panel to settle the dispute, which continued through 
2016.170 
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Yet while the CAFTA-DR appeared to disfavor Guatemala, the United States did 
concurrently attempt to focus on Guatemalan food insecurity in its economic prosperity 
initiatives. In 2010, 43.4 percent of Guatemala’s population suffered from chronic 
malnutrition, the highest national level in the Western Hemisphere.171 Through the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala created 
initiatives to assist communities in need, especially in the rural areas where half of 
Guatemala’s population lives.172 For example, in Quiche, USAID sponsored a food 
cooperative, which, in 2010, sought to help “small scale agricultural producers to increase 
their incomes and improve quality of life...through the production and exportation of high-
value vegetables, such as French green beans and snow peas, to international markets.”173 
Furthermore, in 2012, with assistance from U.S. officials, the Guatemalan government 
introduced a nutrition initiative for children in their first 1,000 days of life, which included 
“specific nutrition interventions such as the promotion of exclusive breastfeeding and 
increased access to complementary, fortified food, and to health and nutrition services and 
counseling.”174 
To address citizen security in Guatemala, the United States supported programs to 
combat narcotrafficking, mainly through the Central American Regional Security Initiative 
(CARSI). CARSI was introduced in 2010 and was a security package that separated Central 
America from Mexico to address specific security challenges in that area. The initiative’s 
stated goals were: 
 create safe streets for citizens in the region; 
 disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband to, within, and 
between the nations of Central America; 
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 support the development of strong, capable, and accountable Central 
American governments;   
 re-establish effective state presence and security in communities at risk;   
 foster enhanced levels of security coordination and cooperation among 
nations in the region.175 
Across all the countries in Central America, CARSI emphasized counter narcotics 
operations (the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement foreign aid account 
accounted for 66 percent of appropriations). Specific to Guatemala, between 2008 and 
2012, it received 22.5 percent of CARSI funding—the most of any country.176 It also 
limited funding to the Guatemalan military because of its legacy of human rights abuses 
during the civil war from 1960 to 1996.177 
The United States additionally addressed rule of law concerns in Guatemala 
through the UN-led CICIG. The United States provided most of the funding for CICIG and 
saw the commission as an integral part of achieving U.S. objectives. In a U.S. Embassy in 
Guatemala memorandum to the Department of State (DOS) in March 2009,  U.S. 
Ambassador Stephen McFarland requested continued funding for CICIG and wrote that 
“security issues are at the top of our substantive agenda with the [Government of 
Guatemala]. Guatemala’s rule of law institutions are foundering under a wave of violence, 
much of which is narco-driven. CICIG is the international community’s premier tool in 
shoring up Guatemala’s [rule of law] institutions and combatting impunity.”178 Guatemala 
faced not only one of the highest murder rates in the world at the time of CICIG’s creation 
in 2006 (43.928 homicides per 100,000 citizens), but also one of the highest rates of 
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impunity for those who committed the homicides (94 percent in 2006).179 The commission 
thus aimed to “investigate illegal security groups and clandestine security organizations in 
Guatemala—criminal groups believed to have infiltrated state institutions fostering 
impunity and undermining democratic gains in Guatemala.”180 The commission did not 
override Guatemalan law, but, rather, sought to assist in strengthening the domestic 
institutions charged with investigating crimes and establishing justice. Laura Zamudio 
Gonzáles writes, “[CICIG] was conceived as an instrument of hybrid international 
intervention, combining national and international resources to investigate and prosecute—
together with the state—the criminal structures that have infiltrated in and that affect the 
process of peace building in the postconflict context.”181 
The United States supported CICIG at the beginning of the commission’s mandate, 
as it initially targeted improving investigations in violent crimes and then in 2013, as the 
organization transitioned to prioritizing combatting corruption. For instance, ahead of a 
visit to Guatemala from then-Vice President Joe Biden in February 2015, the embassy 
wrote in its read-ahead document that CICIG was “a U.S. rule of law priority in 
Guatemala.”182 Overall, CICIG and Guatemala’s attorney general achieved some 
successes and failures. Guatemala reformed its Law Against Organized Crime, which 
established more effective plea bargaining and established a witness protection program, 
and it also helped reduce the impunity rate for homicides from 94 to 72 percent by 2012.183 
 
179 “Intentional Homicides (per 100,000 People) - Guatemala,” The World Bank, accessed March 5, 
2021, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5?end=2006&locations=GT&start=1995; 
“Saving Guatemala’s Fight Against Crime and Impunity,” International Crisis Group, October 24, 2018, 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/guatemala/70-saving-guatemalas-
fight-against-crime-and-impunity. 
180 “CICIG: International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala,” Political and Peacebuilding 
Affairs, accessed March 5, 2021, https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/cicig. 
181 Laura Zamudio González, “The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala 
(CICIG): A Self-Directed Organization,” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and 
International Organizations 25, no. 3 (September 25, 2019): 418–44, https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-
02503007. 
182 U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, “Scenesetter for Vice President Biden’s Visit to Guatemala March 2–
4, 2015” (U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act, February 26, 2015), www.foia.state.gov. 
183 Héctor Silva Ávalos and Parker Asmann, “5 Takeaways from CICIG, Guatemala’s Anti-
Corruption Experiment,” InSight Crime, September 5, 2019, https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/5-
takeaways-cicig-guatemala-anti-corruption-experiment/. 
52 
Most critically, the CICIG uncovered government corruption at the highest levels. 
According to Günther Maihold, some of the most prominent cases included, “Rodrigo 
Rosenberg, a lawyer who staged his own murder to accuse the president of murder, and 
Alfonso Portillo, a former Guatemalan president accused of corruption and ties with 
organized crime.”184 Additionally, in 2015, as public support for the CICIG grew but 
decreased amongst government officials, CICIG exposed a vast criminal ring that 
controlled the country’s tax administration.185 The case, known as La Linea (The Line), 
ultimately led to the resignation of President Otto Pérez Molina and Vice President Roxana 
Baldetti.186  
Beyond its advocacy for rule of law, the United States shifted its other policy 
priority in 2014 to reducing irregular migration through the U.S. Strategy for Engagement 
in Central America (this strategy also coincided with, but was not a result of, the surge of 
unaccompanied minors at the U.S.-Mexico border). As the name of the initiative suggests, 
the policy shift also took a whole-of-region approach. The Obama administration 
introduced the strategy in 2014 and “prioritized prosperity, governance, and security as 
interconnected and interdependent objectives,”187 wherein the U.S. government pursued 
increased coordination across public and private organizations, such as the DOS, the 
Department of Defense, and non-governmental organizations, who work within the Central 
American countries.188 Specific to Guatemala, USAID launched a $40 million program in 
“the most violent communities to reduce the risk factors for youth involvement in gangs 
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and address [ed] factors driving migration to the United States.”189 The strategy also 
targeted a goal for Northern Triangle governments to create their own plan, with U.S. 
support, to address the economic and security challenges for their citizens, which was 
called the Alliance for Prosperity (A4P).190 Furthermore, separate from this strategy but 
important to U.S. migration policy in Guatemala, Guatemalan immigrants were not 
protected under Temporary Protected Status (TPS) unlike the other countries in the 
Northern Triangle. According to the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala in 2015, “there [was] a 
palpable sense among many Guatemalans that they are due some sort of immigration 
relief.”191  
C. U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: OFFICIAL SPEECHES 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Guatemala twice, 2010 and 2011, and 
then-Vice President Biden visited Guatemala three times, once a year between 2014 and 
2016. The following section analyzes those visits and their public diplomacy efforts, which 
will demonstrate how PD messaging in speeches transitioned from focusing on security—
specifically combatting narcotrafficking—to an emphasis on rule of law and reducing 
irregular migration.  
In March 2010, during her shared remarks with Guatemalan President Álvaro 
Colom, Clinton spoke of their “shared interests in advancing security, social inclusion, and 
broad-based economic progress…and of the need to protect the rights of workers and to 
promote truly sustainable and effective economic growth.”192 Approximately a third of her 
short, prepared remarks centered on the democratic crisis in Honduras, which had 
experienced a military coup d’état in June 2009. Yet it was not her prepared remarks, but 
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her admission that the United States was “part of the problem”193 in Guatemala’s drug 
violence that drew headlines. In a broadcast from Prensa Libre, one of Guatemala’s top 
media agencies, it only quoted Clinton saying, “We know we are part of the problem. And 
that’s an admission that we have been willing to make this past year and it’s one of the 
reasons why we feel so strongly about trying to help countries like Guatemala fight this 
terrible criminal scrouge.”194 In an online op-ed from La Hora newspaper, the first two 
lines read, “We know we are part of the problem.”195 Though Clinton emphasized 
combatting crime, this media coverage diminished Guatemala’s own role in 
narcotrafficking and violence within its own country; based on Clinton’s initial speech, it 
was likely not the desired U.S. message for her visit. 
Clinton traveled to Guatemala once again in June 2011 as part of the Central 
American Security Conference. Given the topic of the event, Clinton’s remarks centered 
on security in the region, but there were two marked differences is this speech compared 
to 2010. First, she ensured to continually underscore the “shared responsibility” in regional 
security issues (in the first three paragraphs of her speech, she says the word “shared” six 
times), thus minimizing the chances that the media would single out the United States’ role 
in increasing regional violence. This time, La Prensa broadcasted, “Clinton announces 
more help from the U.S. to Central America,”196 and on the front page of La Hora, a picture 
of Clinton with her team accompanied a headline that read, “Latin America and developed 
countries make mutual demands: narco monopolizes summit agenda.”197 Secondly, 
Clinton also emphasized democratic rule of law during her visit; she spotlighted 
Guatemala’s partnership with CICIG to confront corruption and impunity and, more 
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symbolically, the first representative from the Guatemalan government that she met with 
was during a photo opportunity with Claudia Paz y Paz, the country’s attorney general.198  
In Biden’s three trips to Guatemala, he expanded on Clinton’s narrative and then 
echoed the interconnected and interdependent nature of prosperity, governance, and 
security outlined in the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. In June 2014, 
Biden flew to Guatemala to meet with representatives from the Northern Triangle to 
address the surge of unaccompanied minors at the U.S.-Mexico border. Given the urgency 
of the problem at hand, Biden used strong and emotive language to speak and connect 
directly to the citizens of the region. He said, “There is nothing humane about what these 
traffickers are doing. And I can’t imagine a parent, the desperation they must feel to hand 
your daughter over to one of these thugs, these criminals. But it’s clear we have to deal 
with the root causes, the root causes of what drives people.”199 It was also during this 
speech that he announced, “work to counter and correct the misinformation smugglers are 
propagating about U.S. immigration policy, and discourage families from sending their 
children on this perilous journey.” 
Biden’s tone changed during his March 2015 visit to Guatemala’s capital. Once 
again, he visited the region to address irregular migration, specifically to work with 
Northern Triangle leaders on their jointly created A4P. Unlike his last visit in 2014, his 
speech was mainly directed to government elites and potential business investors. He 
explained, “It’s in our self-interest, and I would suggest—respectfully suggest yours—to 
help them find jobs and physical security. Because the people who tend to leave are the 
people with the most talent. The people who tend to leave are the people who can be the 
greatest—make the greatest contributions to a community. And if we don’t do this, all of 
us will feel the consequences.”200 Furthermore, the only instance he specifically 
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highlighted Guatemala was to emphasize its work to “remove senior officials suspected of 
corruption and aiding human trafficking…[and] ending business disputes to clear the way 
for new investment.”201 During his time in Guatemala, he visited a Model Police Precinct 
and spoke with at-risk youth.202 Additionally, he met with Guatemalan civil society 
members, which, according to an embassy memorandum, was to “underscore U.S. support 
for human rights and rule-of-law, including our support for extending the UN’s [CICIG] 
mandate past 2015.”203 Based on the content of his speeches and the fact that only Biden, 
and not Clinton, met with civil Guatemalan groups, it appears the United States was putting 
additional emphasis over time on influencing the Guatemalan public to trust democratic 
rule of law and to stop migration north. 
This stress on fighting corruption and supporting rule of law would carry through 
into Biden’s next visit to Guatemala in January 2016 during the inauguration of President 
Jimmy Morales. A political outsider and former comedian, Morales won the presidency 
with 67.4 percent of the vote.204 Only months prior, in September 2015, the preceding 
Guatemalan president, Otto Pérez Molina resigned amid the La Linea corruption scandal 
initially uncovered by the CICIG. Thus, it is not surprising that Biden said, “I truly believe 
that the next great success story in this hemisphere can be the Northern Triangle -- 
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. As I told your colleagues for the last three years, 
the single biggest impediment for that success is corruption.” He went on to discuss his 
country’s commitment to reducing irregular migration, noting that the United States had 
given $750 million to help the Northern Triangle countries, but that it had one caveat: “And 
so we are in this with you. As long as you continue to meet your commitments—and you 
have thus far—we are all in.” These visits from Biden demonstrate the transition of the 
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United States’ policy and public diplomacy from focusing on combatting narcotrafficking 
to prioritizing the importance of CICIG and curbing irregular migration. 
D. U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 
The U.S. Embassy in Guatemala’s use of strategic communication through 
conventional and social media would also shift between 2009 and 2016; in this case, the 
embassy’s messaging would become more concise and more integrated with U.S. policy. 
Prior to 2014, the U.S. loosely tied its communication to the four U.S. priorities: increasing 
citizen security, boosting economic prosperity, supporting rule of law through CICIG, and 
reducing irregular migration. Then, in 2014, there was an increased focus on targeting 
government corruption ̶ likely because of the 2015 La Linea corruption scandal ̶ and on the 
latter three priorities. The embassy rarely shared information on security programs, or, if it 
did, it often branded them as development initiatives. Concerning the Guatemalan public, 
television and radio were the most popular ways they received information, though internet 
usage increased significantly during this time period.  
With conventional media, interviews from U.S. Ambassadors Arnold Chacón and 
Todd Robinson between 2011 and 2016 demonstrate how U.S. strategic messaging became 
more integrated with U.S. policy. During Chacón’s tenure, he appeared to mainly focus on 
economic assistance to alleviate poverty. In a 2011 online video interview with Presna 
Libre, when asked about the biggest challenges in Guatemala, he said, “What worries me 
the most is the malnutrition, the poverty, that affects a great part of the country.”205 While 
he also spoke about natural disasters and the possibility of TPS for Guatemalans, it is worth 
noting what he did not mention: corruption, security, or rule of law. During a February 
2012 on-camera interview with GuateVision, Chacón once more did not speak about U.S. 
priorities when asked to comment on the Guatemalan initiative to decriminalize drugs; 
Chacon simply replied, “This will not affect our desire to help Guatemala in what is 
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important.”206 Lastly, in December of that same year, he again only focused on poverty 
and USAID programs during a La Prensa print interview commemorating the change in 
the Mayan calendar.207 It is clear Chacón prioritized using the media to speak with the 
Guatemalan public; however, most of his messaging lacked a clear connection to U.S. 
policy concerns in the region. 
The content of U.S. strategic communication changed in 2014 upon the arrival of 
Robinson. From 2014 to 2016, he took a more succinct and cohesive (and sometimes blunt) 
stance when speaking about U.S. initiatives and challenges to reduce both corruption and 
impunity. In June 2015, as the country reeled from the La Linea corruption scandal, 
Robinson reiterated on several occasions U.S. support for judicial processes and a 
transparent government.208 In an extensive interview with Nómada, he said, “My first 
words in the country, when I arrived, were against corruption; for transparency; better 
justice; more secure markets for both local and foreign entrepreneurs and my support for 
CICIG. This hasn’t changed.”209 Even during celebratory events, Robinson continued to 
concentrate on democratic rule of law. For example, in a Soy502 print interview on July 4, 
2016, as he handed out candy to embassy guests he declared, “Guatemala demonstrated 
commitment to rebuilding and strengthening democratic institutions.”210 Though 
Robinson did concisely communicate most of his country’s priorities, like his predecessor 
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Chacón, he once more neglected to speak about security. There are two potential reasons 
for the omittance. First, the United States wanted to distance itself from the legacy of the 
36-year civil war from 1960 to 1996, during which armed forces committed numerous 
human rights abuses.211 Second, the U.S. Embassy simply did not seek to meld its security 
initiatives with its other communication efforts. Instead, they grouped those programs 
under development projects. In a research interview conducted by Nicholas Philips, a 
USAID official said, “There’s no CARSI branding or marketing plan, so even if we wanted 
to brand something as ‘CARSI,’ we wouldn’t have the tools to do so.”212 Phillips 
continues, that in a 2014 USAID presentation on CARSI-funded crime prevention 
programming, “CARSI did not appear anywhere in the slideshow.”213 The U.S. agencies 
in charge of CARSI programs may have wanted to simplify its messaging and saw no 
reason to integrate security messages with those on development. 
Not only did U.S. strategic communication to Guatemalans shift in conventional 
media, but it also transitioned in its use of social media between 2009 and 2016. During 
this time, it changed from using social media primarily to share optimistic stories and 
information to increasing overall communication to connect with Guatemalans, with an 
emphasis on building trust for CICIG and distributing information on migration. For 
example, in 2011, the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala’s Facebook created a photo campaign 
called, “Un Momento en Mi Mundo” (A Moment in my World), where Guatemalans 
entered their own content to be highlighted online; the winners of the contest were then 
invited to the embassy for a cultural event.214 In the summer of 2014, it ran a trivia contest 
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about soccer during the men’s World Cup tournament.215 Though this trivia contest was 
entertaining, it is unusual given that this contest was occurring simultaneously with the 
crisis at the U.S.-Mexico border, which the embassy did not mention on their Facebook 
page. The lack of correlation with U.S. policies on the embassy’s social media pages 
changed in 2014, when it began to interact more with its online audience, which sought to 
build trust in CICIG and share more information on how to immigrate legally. For example, 
in July 2015, the embassy wrote, “The government of the United States strongly supports 
the efforts of [CICIG],”216 which received a higher engagement rate based on increased 
“likes” and comments compared to other posts around the same month. Furthermore, 
Robinson began a popular series on the embassy Facebook page where he signed on for 
“chats” to answer questions from the community and to highlight his priorities. These posts 
would usually garner hundreds of comments and allowed Robinson to communicate 
unfiltered messages to the public.217 Additionally, in August 2016, the embassy posted 
more than 20 videos on legal migration to their YouTube channel, which would serve to 
counter misinformation on immigrating to the United States.218 This shift in strategic 
communication on social media is likely for two reasons: First, internet usage increased 
across the country and thus, more people would be on social media platforms. While 
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Voluntaria” y “Deportación”? [What is the difference between “Voluntary Exit” and “Deportation”?] 
2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OQlB4vDPUiM; U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, ¿Se Puede 
Coordinar Una Cita de Grupo Para La Entrevista de Visa? [Can you coordinate a group meeting for visa 
interview?]  2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XyKpk4-9_lA. 
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television and radio remained the more prominent information source, the percentage of 
Guatemalans with internet access increased from 10.5 percent in 2010 to 35.5 percent in 
2015.219 Second, Robinson valued social media as a communication tool. He was the first 
U.S. ambassador in Guatemala to develop an online presence specifically to communicate 
with the local public. Simply based on how much time and effort he took to answering 
questions on the social media pages, it illustrates that he prioritized the medium to connect 
with Guatemalans, especially when seeking to shape support for CICIG and reduce 
irregular migration. 
E. CONCLUSION 
When seeking to understand why the U.S. varied its public diplomacy in Guatemala 
between 2009 and 2016, because of Guatemalan government corruption, the United States 
endeavored to shape Guatemalans’ attitudes toward rule of law, economic prosperity, 
violence reduction, and immigration. As Biden said in his 2016 speech, “The single biggest 
impediment for … success is corruption.” The United States saw it as a hindrance in 
economic practices and in its security partnerships. As corruption scandals emerged, the 
United States increased its volume of support for CICIG on the public sphere to build trust 
in the commission. By 2014, the United States saw corruption as a causal factor in the 
violence that forcing thousands of Guatemalans to send their children north.  
This chapter used high-level speeches and strategic communication to demonstrate 
how the United States began to emphasize the public more and seek more opportunities to 
connect from 2009 to 2016. Whether that was through meetings with civic organizations 
or by taking more time to speak with the public on Facebook page, these PD efforts sought 
to counter government corruption to build trust in rule of law and reduce irregular 
migration. 
 
219 “Guatemala,” Media Landscapes, accessed March 11, 2021, https://medialandscapes.org/country/
guatemala; “Individuals Using the Internet (% of Population) - Guatemala,” The World Bank, accessed 
March 11, 2021, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?locations=GT. 
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V. CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN U.S. PUBLIC 
DIPLOMACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA’S NORTHERN TRIANGLE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis utilized a soft power framework to examine U.S. public diplomacy (PD) 
efforts in Central America’s Northern Triangle—El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala—
between 2009 and 2016. I considered U.S. foreign policy addressing each of the three 
countries and then analyzed complementary U.S. PD efforts. I conclude that during this 
period, U.S. foreign policy goals were relatively consistent across the Northern Triangle, 
but that soft power initiatives to support democracy resulted in important variations of U.S. 
PD. These initiatives included strengthening the U.S. relationship with the host country’s 
executive branch (El Salvador), reestablishing democracy after a coup d’état (Honduras), 
and combatting corruption at the highest levels of government (Guatemala). This chapter 
provides summaries of the soft power public diplomacy framework—Soft Power and 
Smart Power—and of the three case studies on the Northern Triangle countries. I then 
provide alternative explanations and areas for further research. Finally, given the recent 
inauguration of President Joe Biden, who had taken an active role in U.S. diplomatic 
initiatives in the Northern Triangle between 2009 and 2016, I provide potential PD 
recommendations as he seeks to shape, attract, or persuade target audiences in the Northern 
Triangle. 
B. SOFT POWER AND SMART POWER PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
The foundational assumption of this thesis is that PD is a critical tool in a country’s soft 
power arsenal. According to Joseph Nye, “This soft power—getting others to want the 
outcomes that you want—co-opts people rather than coerces them.”220 Soft power PD is 
essentially the use of communication to influence foreign audiences so that they “want 
what you want.” Soft power scholars are divided into two schools of thought: Soft Power 
PD and Smart Power PD. Soft Power PD concentrates on attracting audiences to particular 
 
220 Joseph S. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 616 (2008): 95. 
64 
cultural or political values, with an ultimate goal of shaping their country’s policies. Smart 
Power PD, introduced in the early 2000s, more closely integrates hard and soft power “in 
ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor’s purposes are advanced effectively 
and efficiently.”221 In short, Soft Power PD often maintains a distance from hard power 
initiatives whereas Smart Power PD aims to integrate and balance the two types of power, 
hard and soft. 
Because of the close economic, security, and cultural ties between the United States and 
the countries in Central America’s Northern Triangle, the soft power approach to PD 
offered an appropriate lens to evaluate U.S. PD efforts in the region between 2009 and 
2016. Indeed, my research found that the United States regularly used PD to persuade or 
attract Central American publics to support its foreign policy objectives. The evidence 
indicates that U.S. soft power initiatives to support democracy shaped the variation in U.S. 
PD efforts across the Northern Triangle. These soft power initiatives were unique to each 
country and were primarily driven by domestic political conditions. Furthermore, during 
the observed timeframe, global telecommunications were expanding, which offered an 
opportunity to understand how the United States varied its PD through the adoption of 
social media “digital diplomacy,” as more foreign audiences moved online to 
communicate. 
In 2014, Central America’s Northern Triangle entered the U.S. media news cycle because 
of the surge of unaccompanied minors from that region at the U.S.-Mexico border. 
Between October 2013 and June 2014, more than 52,000 minors arrived at the border, 
initiating U.S. policy responses and separate communication campaigns to deter further 
migration.222 Based on the tone of U.S. media coverage, it might be assumed that the 
United States employs the same policy plans and PD tactics not solely concerning irregular 
 
221 Ernest J. Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power,” The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 616 (March 2008): 116. 
222 “Unaccompanied Minors,” Pub. L. No. HRG-2014-HSC-0030, § Committee on Homeland 
Security. House (2014), https://congressional-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/congressional/result/
congressional/congdocumentview?accountid=12702&groupid=100340&parmId=1778402F045#1900. 
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migration, but for all its policies.223 From a global perspective, U.S. foreign policy in 
Central America, in fact, was similar. For example, all three countries were part of the 
Dominican Republic ̶ Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), as well as 
received funds through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). Yet, 
taking a closer look at specific plans and goals reveals that the United States faced different 
policy challenges within the three countries. With CAFTA-DR, the United States dealt with 
a labor law dispute in Guatemala; with CARSI, its governing documents specifically 
outlined different parameters for funding to Honduras and Guatemala due to respective 
rule of law and human rights abuses. These variations in policy alone do not provide 
enough evidence of why the United States might vary its PD. The following summary of 
the three cases studies shows that the U.S. soft power initiatives to support democracy 
shaped the variations in U.S. PD efforts to attract or persuade its foreign audiences between 
2009 and 2016. 
C. EL SALVADOR: STRENGTHENING THE U.S.-SALVADORAN 
RELATIONSHIP 
In El Salvador, the United States shifted its policy from an emphasis on bi-lateral relations 
(mainly through the Salvadoran-specific aid package called the Partnership for Growth) to 
a whole-of-region approach via the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. 
Between 2009 and 2016, combatting crime, increasing economic prosperity, and reducing 
irregular migration took the top spots as U.S. policy priorities. In the public sphere, the 
United States utilized its soft power to solidify the U.S.-El Salvador relationship, especially 
with its Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) President Mauricio Funes. 
Since the FMLN was left-leaning and had ties to the guerilla forces that fought the U.S.-
backed Salvadoran government in the 1980s, there were concerns that the United States 
would distance itself from the new administration. Thus, the United States sought to temper 
 
223 Amanda Taub, “The Violence Driving the Child-Refugee Crisis,” Vox, June 30, 2014, 
https://www.vox.com/2014/6/30/5842054/violence-in-central-america-and-the-child-refugee-crisis; 
“Obama Warns Central Americans: ‘Do Not Send Your Children To The Borders,’” ABC News, June 26, 
2014, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obama-warns-central-americans-send-children-borders/
story?id=24320063; Alan Greenblatt, “What’s Causing The Latest Immigration Crisis? A Brief Explainer,” 
NPR, July 9, 2014, https://www.npr.org/2014/07/09/329848538/whats-causing-the-latest-immigration-
crisis-a-brief-explainer. 
66 
those apprehensions. An official visit from President Barack Obama in 2011 most 
exemplifies this goal. Given that El Salvador was the only country in the Northern Triangle 
that Obama visited during his two terms in office, the visit signified that the United States 
desired to establish support for its relationship with El Salvador. Furthermore, Obama also 
joined Funes at Monsignor Romero’s grave, an important historic symbol from the 
Salvadoran Civil War, during which government forces fought the FMLN from 1980 to 
1992. 
Once the United States appeared to establish the relationship with the Salvadoran 
executive branch in 2013, it shifted its focus to economic investment, democratic 
processes, and a commitment to joint security initiatives. Simultaneously, Salvadorans 
began to increasingly use the internet to communicate; while the percentage of the local 
population using the internet never exceeded 25 percent, the United States did expand to 
its social media PD to platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Via these online 
communications, they used soft power campaigns to inspire national pride in Salvadorans 
with the goal of deterring them from migrating north. 
D. HONDURAS: DEALING WITH THE EFFECTS OF THE 
MILITARY COUP 
In Honduras, the military coup d’état in June 2009 that ousted President Manuel 
“Mel” Zelaya defined U.S. policy PD efforts between 2009 and 2016. The United States 
lacked clear policy and direction when it dealt with the coup, hindering the influence of the 
United States to reinstate a democratic government. Thus, the coup impacted U.S. PD 
efforts in two ways: First, because the United States did not want to give credence to the 
ousters, from 2010 to 2012, it publicly distanced itself from both the new president and the 
Honduran population; second, in the wake of the coup, the new government severely 
limited freedom of expression, censoring what few messages the United States did try to 
communicate to Hondurans via the news media. 
Even after the Hondurans democratically elected a new president, the United States 
still struggled to engage in its security and economic programs because of challenges to 
democratic rule of law and respect for human rights. The visit from then-Vice President 
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Joe Biden in 2012 demonstrates this tension. His visit indicated U.S. support for the 
Honduran government, yet during his short time in country, he did not engage with civil 
society or members of the public, which was different compared to Obama’s visit to El 
Salvador, as well as Biden’s three visits to Guatemala during the same timeframe.  
The United States attempted to use strategic communication through traditional and social 
media to integrate within U.S. policy, especially to build support for democratic rule of law 
and deter irregular migration. Yet, because of continued limitations to press freedom and 
the small percentage of Hondurans that used the internet, U.S. messaging likely did not 
reach as many members of the public as desired. 
E. GUATEMALA: GENERATING SUPPORT TO COMBAT 
CORRUPTION AND IMPUNITY 
High-level government corruption colored U.S. policy and its complementary PD 
efforts in Guatemala between 2009 and 2016. While the United States did emphasize 
security and economic prosperity in its policies, its support for the United Nations-led 
International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was the priority in both 
the private and public diplomatic spheres. Later, in 2014, the United States also dedicated 
more policy and PD resources to reducing irregular migration. As stated earlier, Biden 
visited Guatemala three times during that seven-year period. He met with leaders from the 
other two Northern Triangle countries during those visits, mostly to discuss the Alliance 
for Prosperity as part of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, and his 
public remarks centered on economic development to deter migration. Unlike his visit to 
Honduras, however, he also added engagements with civil society and the public, 
indicating that the U.S. valued interactions with the public to achieve its policy goals. Of 
note, Biden never emphasized the historic legacy of the 36-year Civil War that ended in 
1996. Additionally, after the resignation of Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina in 
2015, Biden’s visit for the inauguration of the next president, Jimmy Morales, reinforced 
the U.S. priority to oppose corruption and fight impunity.  
In regard to combatting irregular migration through strategic communication, the 
U.S. Embassy increased its use of social media to share information on the visa process as 
well as boosted its two-way communication with Guatemalans. Of all the U.S. Embassies 
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in the Northern Triangle, the embassy in Guatemala posted the most information about 
how to legally immigrate to the United States on its social media websites. This broadening 
of communication also coincided with the arrival of U.S. Ambassador Todd Robinson, 
who, compared to both his predecessors in-country as well as his counterparts in Honduras 
and Guatemala, utilized more internet communication to directly connect with the public. 
Throughout his tenure, Robinson used his soft power influence to not only provide 
information on the legal way to arrive in the United States, but he also continued to build 
public support for CICIG with hopes that it would pressure the Guatemalan government to 
keep it in place. 
F. KEY FINDING: U.S. SOFT POWER INITIATIVES EXPLAIN 
VARIANCE IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
Comparing the three case studies, U.S. soft power initiatives–and not smart power–
varied U.S. PD in Central America’s Northern Triangle between 2009 and 2016. In El 
Salvador, the United States focused on strengthening the Funes-Obama relationship; in 
Honduras, the United States centered on reestablishing the presidency after the military 
coup; and in Guatemala, the United States prioritized fighting corruption and impunity at 
the highest levels of government, including the presidency. Furthermore, despite United 
States funding for security programs, rarely did the United States embed those initiatives 
(the hard power) with its other programs or PD actions. 
G. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION, LIMITATIONS TO RESEARCH, 
AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
While the findings of this research point to Soft Power PD factors that caused 
variation in U.S. communications in Central America’s Northern Triangle, there were, 
however, elements of Smart Power PD in U.S. efforts. Especially toward the end of the 
time period researched, U.S. PD had begun to display elements of more integrated soft and 
hard power elements. In all the countries, by 2015, the United States employed a blend of 
techniques to deter irregular migration, whether it was through national pride campaigns 
(El Salvador), support for democratic rule of law (Honduras and Guatemala), or advocacy 
for anti-corruption organizations (Guatemala), that were then partnered with increased 
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security at the U.S.-Mexico border. However, there is no conclusive evidence that the U.S. 
embassies in Central America’s Northern Triangle were actively looking to balance their 
hard and soft power initiatives within their PD strategy; at the same time, it is important to 
note that the United States varied its PD based soft power initiatives, especially support for 
democracy. 
Furthermore, there were some limitations in research. Interviews with U.S. 
Embassy personnel, a wider range of media sources, and surveys with the public would 
provide further evidence to support this conclusion about Soft Power PD. Lastly, this thesis 
did not research other potentially important actors, such as other governments or criminal 
organizations, and their communication objectives. As Nye wrote, “Conventional wisdom 
has always held that the state with the largest military prevails, but in an information age 
it may be the state (or nonstates) with the best story that wins.”224 This thesis only looked 
at the U.S. story, but analyzing the stories of the other actors would give researchers and 
policymakers a more comprehensive understanding of the information environment. 
H. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY 
At this time, the new Biden administration is once again dealing with a surge of 
migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border. According to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), in February 2021, there were “100,441 persons attempting entry along the 
Southwest border. This total represented a 28 percent increase over January 2021,”225 and 
since October 2020, more than 29,000 unaccompanied minors hoped to gain entry into the 
United States.226  
Thus, once again, the administration will likely seek to influence and persuade 
Central Americans from migrating north; an awareness of its previous practices could help 
in PD strategy development. Based on this research, it is important for the United States to 
 
224 Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), xiii. 
225 “CBP Announces February 2021 Operational Update,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
March 10, 2021, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-announces-february-2021-
operational-update. 
226 U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 
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understand that a dichotomy between messaging and policy could lead to confusion 
amongst the publics it hopes to shape. This is especially challenging because the Biden 
administration is seeking to distance itself from former President Donald Trump and his 
immigration policies, but in doing so, it might be giving the perception that the United 
States will now accept all who wish to immigrate.227 Furthermore, I recommend promoting 
messaging beyond the positive “soft” messages on U.S. culture and values: as seen on the 
U.S. Embassy’s social media pages in El Salvador 2013, it was communicating positive 
messages about visiting the United States while also pursuing policy goals of reducing 
irregular migration. Nor is it recommended, however, that the United States stay silent in 
the public sphere on the crises, as was the case of the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala in June 
2014. 
Beyond the implications for future U.S. PD in combatting irregular migration, the 
United States will also be contending with the potential damaging effects of the COVID-
19 pandemic, the growth of populism in the Northern Triangle, and the rise of 
counternarratives from other great powers. Between 2009 and 2016, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras each dealt with their own challenges to rule of law, corruption, 
crime, and economics; irregular migration is a symptom of those challenges and it is 
recommended that the United States continues to target those issues in concert with any 
migration foreign policy and corresponding public diplomacy efforts. 
 
227 Franco Ordoñez, “‘The Border Is Not Open’: Biden Administration Seeks Foreign Aid To Slow 
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